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2ABSTRACT
The extreme importance of critical infrastructures to modern society is widely recognized.
These infrastructures are complex, interdependent, and ubiquitous; they are sensitive to
disruptions that can lead to cascading failures with serious consequences.  Protecting the
critical infrastructures from terrorism, human generated malevolent attack directed toward
maximum social disruption, presents an enormous challenge.  Recognizing that society cannot
afford the costs associated with absolute protection, it is necessary to identify the critical
locations in these infrastructures.  By protecting the critical locations society achieves the
greatest benefit for the protection investment.  This paper presents a methodology for the
identification of critical locations in infrastructures.  The framework models the
infrastructures as interconnected digraphs and employs graph theory and reliability theory to
identify the vulnerable points.  The vulnerable points are screened for their susceptibility to a
terrorist attack, and a prioritized list of critical locations is produced. The prioritization
methodology is based on multi-attribute utility theory.  The methodology is illustrated
through the presentation of a portion on the analysis conducted on the campus of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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7I.  Introduction
Critical Infrastructures provide the very foundation for the standard of living in the
United States and other Western Democracies.  These infrastructures form an over-arching net
covering the modern way of life.  The infrastructures are large, diffuse, heterogeneous, inter-
connected networks, and while critically important, the infrastructures are difficult to control
reliably.    They include numerous interaction points and local disturbances can cascade very
quickly.  The complexity of these networks leads to difficulty in modeling and control
methodologies.  The importance of these infrastructures has long been recognized.  Executive
Order 13010, July 15, 1996, [Clinton, 1996] stated:
America’s critical infrastructures underpin every aspect of our lives.
They are the foundations of our prosperity, enablers of our defense, and
the vanguard of our future.  They empower every element of our society.
There is no more urgent priority than assuring the security, continuity,
and availability of our critical infrastructures…
Two recent events highlight the vulnerability of the critical infrastructures.  First, the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, were conducted through exploitation of the Transportation
infrastructure.  The great oceans no longer provide sufficient protection; America must defend
itself against malicious attack.  Second, the East Coast blackout of August 14, 2003,
demonstrated the fragility of one particular infrastructure, the electrical generation and
distribution networks.  Roughly 50 million people across the North Eastern United States and
Eastern Canada suffered one of North America's worst ever electric power outages.  The loss
of electricity cascaded through several other critical infrastructures.  For example, water was
lost due to loss of power at the pumping stations, and transportation was hampered due to the
loss of air and ground traffic control.  Terrorist acts have similarities and differences with
natural and technological disasters, but are distinguished by a malevolent intelligence directed
toward maximum social disruption.  One subset of the potential targets of terrorist acts is the
nation’s critical infrastructures [OHS, 2002]. Critical infrastructures are complex,
interdependent, and ubiquitous; they are sensitive to disruptions that can lead to cascading
failures with serious consequences.  Complex national infrastructures have critical nodes or
choke points that, if attacked, could lead to significant disruption or destruction.  [Garrick,
2004]  Conventional assaults with truck bombs, dynamite, or cable cutting, as well as
8computer generated attacks, could unleash a chain of events in which a service grid, an oil of
gas pipeline, or an air traffic control system collapses with cascading effect. [Garrick, 2004]
After September 11th, critical infrastructure protection became a national focus and is
likely to remain one for the foreseeable future.  The federal government has reorganized
agencies into a Department of Homeland Security, and all levels of government have been
increasing resources and taking specific measures (such as tightening airline security) for
infrastructure protection.  An excellent overview of the terrorist threat is presented in the
article Infrastructure Issues for Cities – Countering Terrorist Threat [Gilbert, et al, 2003].
The authors identify the importance of the critical infrastructures to the United States’ cities;
over 80% of the US population lives in and around the cities.  [U.S. Census 2000]  The
challenges in protecting United States’ cities from multiple coordinated attacks are addressed.
A key point presented by the authors is that the infrastructure systems were never intended by
their designers to resist the consequences of planned malicious destruction.  [Gilbert, et al,
2003]  Additional perspectives are available on the state of the terrorist threat (for example
[Garrick, 2002; Deisler, 2002; and Haimes, 2002].  The National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets [Bush, 2003] identifies critical
infrastructures and key assets, Table I.1.
Critical Infrastructures Key Assets
Agriculture and Food National Monuments, Icons
Water Nuclear Power Plants
Public Health Dams
Emergency Services Government Facilities
Defense Industrial Base Commercial Key Assets
Telecommunications
Energy
Transportation
Banking and Finance
Chemicals, Hazardous Materials
Postal and Shipping
Table I.1 Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
A systematic approach to the identification of the significant relevant risks from
terrorism, and the development of effective measures for managing them, has not yet been
undertaken [OHS, 2002].  Society has limited resources and can ill-afford to use them on
9measures that have not been demonstrated effective.  An example is the recent National
Research Council report on countering terrorism [NRC, 2002].  This report offers numerous
recommendations for the reduction of vulnerabilities in transportation systems, information
technology, energy systems, and other infrastructures.  Implementing all of them would
impose a considerable financial burden on the nation and would ignore the probabilities of
these vulnerabilities.  Furthermore, the costs and risk-reduction potential of proposed counter-
terrorism measures have not yet been evaluated systematically. A framework that would allow
for a rigorous evaluation of the merits of such proposals would be highly desirable.  This
project takes steps toward creating a screening methodology for the identification of critical
locations.  Developing the complete framework requires overcoming significant challenges,
including the geographic and organizational diffusiveness of infrastructure systems, and the
importance of multi-organizational responses in disaster prevention, mitigation, and response.
Protecting a complex and interconnected system of infrastructures at the national level
creates major technical challenges because of the complexity and diffuse nature of this
system. Historically, critical infrastructure protection has tended to be addressed on an
infrastructure-specific basis by individual engineering communities (e.g., the electric power
industry). Traditional safety methods such as risk assessment are enabled by features of the
analytical context such as the standardization of the technology, the bounded number of event
triggers of accidents, and the spatial compactness of components.  In contrast, societal
infrastructures are far more idiosyncratic, interconnected across systems, and spread out
geographically (see, for example, [Haimes, 2002; Kunreuther and Lerner-Lam, 2002; Stewart
and Bostrom, 2002]).  Further, societal infrastructures have overlapping ownership and
responsibility in private organizations and local, state, and national government.  Therefore,
technical complexity is matched or exceeded by sociopolitical complexity.  There are many
practical and theoretical challenges to developing effective methods for representing and
planning for infrastructure threats and coordinating actual responses.
Of particular importance are human actions.  For engineering systems, it is the actions
of the facility operators that are modeled using the work of human error theorists [e.g.,
Reason, 1990; Sträter and Bubb, 1999].  Organizational influences on operator performance
are still in a state of development.  [Paté-Cornell, 1990; Davoudian et al, 1994; Reason, 1997;
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Marcinkowski et al, 2001]  The case of infrastructures is very different in that there is not a
well-defined operator crew that attempts to mitigate the accident but, rather, a number of
organizations that would participate in preventing, mitigating, and responding to an event
(e.g., local infrastructure operators, first responders, disaster-recovery agencies).  Drabek
[1985] describes the response to emergencies as “emergent multiorganizational networks”
because the relationships among overlapping responder organizations emerge during the event
rather than from prior planning.  Inter-organizational preparedness is critical to effective
response. [Gillespie and Streeter, 1987]  It is evident, therefore, that the development of
sequences of events leading to undesirable end states will require innovative approaches to the
“recovery” actions.  Building multi-organizational responses into the measurement of critical
infrastructure risk, safety, and priority is a theoretical and practical challenge.
Scenario-based methodologies have been developed to manage the safety of complex
systems such as space systems (the International Space Station [Futron, 2002] and the Shuttle
[SAIC, 1995]), waste repositories [Rechard, 1996], nuclear power plants [USNRC, 1990],
large incinerators [SAIC, 1996], chemical process facilities [CCPS, 1989], municipal water
distribution systems [Ezell et al, 2000], and other systems [Hokstad et al, 2001; Melchers and
Feutril, 2001].  It has also been used to identify research needs.  [Apostolakis et al, 1995]
This methodology is known as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA), or Performance Assessment.  This approach has been found useful
because it:
1. Provides a common understanding of the problem, thus facilitating
communication among various stakeholder groups.
2. Reduces the probability of emotional reactions because it provides a framework
for the evaluation of various risk management proposals.
3. Offers an integrated approach, thus identifying the needs for contributions from
diverse disciplines such as the engineering and the social and behavioral
sciences.
4. Encourages identification of complex interactions between events/systems.
To better understand the relevant issues facing the nation as a whole, it is often useful
to examine a smaller-scale system to uncover insights and issues.  This project pushes deeper
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into the infrastructure protection issue by analyzing the campus of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT), which is a small community embedded within the city of Cambridge,
Massachusetts.  Cambridge is a diverse community, a small city of over 100,000, with
disaster planning coordinated through its own Local Emergency Planning Committee that
includes participation from MIT.  MIT itself can be considered a small town with
approximately six thousand residents and an additional fourteen thousand commuters.  MIT
operates a utility plant, data network, cable television station, and phone system, and has its
own police and medical personnel.  This project has the full cooperation on the MIT
Department of Facilities (DOF), which provided complete information on the infrastructures.
Completeness of the documentation supporting national infrastructures is uncertain.  Some
estimates list up to ten percent of natural gas distribution lines and up to twenty percent of
water distribution lines as undocumented.  The MIT campus contains a Critical Infrastructure,
the Central Utilities Plant (CUP).  The CUP houses a natural gas fired turbine generator which
provides for MIT’s electrical, steam, and air conditioning needs.  Additionally, the CUP
contains the electrical distribution system, controlling on-site generation and back-up
electricity from the local electric utility.  The MIT campus also contains a Key Asset, the
Nuclear Research Reactor.  Although the research reactor is not a power plant as defined by
the National Strategy, it is an excellent representation of Key Asset.
This project examined three critical infrastructures, electric power, water (domestic
and fire protection), and natural gas, and the interactions between them.  The focus was to
develop a methodology for the identification of critical locations in infrastructures.   A critical
location is defined as a point against which a successfully attacked could lead to significant
consequences.  The more serve the consequences, the more critical the location.  On a
national scale many potentially critical locations, such as the George Washington Bridge, in
New York City, or the Hoover Dam, in Boulder City, Nevada, may be easily identified.  Other
locations may only be revealed through analysis of the infrastructures.  For example, a
Financial Institution may have a main communication line for the processing of monetary
transactions and a “completely” independent, back-up communication line, both of which run
underground and connect to the telecommunications network, under the street, at separate
points.  In the event of failure of the main communication line, data is automatically routed
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over the back-up line with minimal disruption.  On initial review the data transmission system
appears secure from a single point failure affecting either data transmission line.  What if both
telecommunication lines pass through the same physical conduit between the building and the
telecommunications network?  Or both lines are, at some point, accessible from the same
manhole?  In that case the data transmission system is subject to a single point failure in the
form of a physical attack on the transmission conduit.
A single point failure is not limited to an individual infrastructure, but may affect
multiple infrastructures.  For example, in portions of Washington, DC, water and electrical
distribution systems occupy the same service tunnels.  The concept of service tunnels and
man-way access points is appealing to many people in urban design and city planning.  By
burying the infrastructures, with limited access points, they are secure from common vandals
and moderate environmental disruptions, and are “out-of-sight” so they don’t distract from
beautification.  Putting multiple infrastructures in common service tunnels creates the
potential for the unintended development of critical locations.
This work discusses a methodology for the identification of individual critical
locations.  Also, the methodology addresses combinations of locations, which when attacked
through simultaneous or sequential events could lead to significant consequences.  The critical
locations, and location combinations, and there ranking according to potential impact will be
the basis of risk informed decision making.
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II. Background
II.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a proven, well established, and systematic
process for examining engineered systems to produce an understanding of the associated
risks.  QRA is typically used to examine systems whose operation is based on design
requirements, and defined human and computer controlled actions.  The quantitative process
combines the probability of an event with the anticipated consequences of the event to
produce an overall risk picture of the system.  QRA is helpful in recognizing the components
and failure modes which contribute the greatest to risk.  In general terms, QRA asks the
following questions [Kaplan and Garrick, 1981]:
• What can go wrong?
• What are the consequences?
• How likely is it?
For a given system, QRA proceeds as follows:
1. A set of undesirable end states is defined, e.g., in terms of individual or
societal risk.
2. For each end state, a set of disturbances to normal operation is defined
which, if uncontained or unmitigated, can lead to the end state.  These are
called initiating events (IEs).
3. Event and fault trees are employed to identify sequences of events that
start with an IE and end at an end state.  Thus, accident scenarios are
generated.
4. The probabilities of these scenarios are evaluated using all available
evidence, primarily past experience and expert judgment.
5. Results are used for “insight” to educate participants, help define
priorities, reveal interdependencies, and show leverage points.  QRA is a
planning-as-learning exercise, not simply an analysis tool.
The definition of end states and IEs is a critical part of risk assessment because it may
lead to an incomplete analysis.  For well-understood systems such as nuclear power plants,
standardized lists of end states and IEs have been developed.  For infrastructures, these must
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be identified using a systematic approach.  The MIT Department of Facilities has developed a
methodology using multiattribute decision analysis for prioritizing maintenance work.
[Karydas and Gifun, 2002]  This work identifies an initial list of end states applicable to MIT
as follows:  Impact on Health, Safety, and the Environment; Economic Impact (physical
property, intellectual property; interruption of academic activities and operations); and Impact
on Public Image.  These end states will serve as the starting point of an iterative process to
identify end states appropriate to terrorist threats.
The next step is to identify the IEs for each end state.  A systematic method for doing
this is to employ a Master Logic Diagram (MLD). [USNRC, 1982; NASA, 2002]  The MLD
is a fault-tree (top-down) type logic diagram that helps to identify the IEs.  Once the IEs have
been identified, standard event/fault trees can be employed to develop sequences of events
that may lead from each IE to each end state.  These sequences include hardware failures,
natural phenomena, and human errors (e.g., during recovery actions).
The evaluation of the probabilities of the scenarios will be another major challenge.
QRAs utilize the Bayesian (degree-of-belief) interpretation of probability that allows the use
of all evidence, i.e., statistical, experiential, and expert judgment. [Apostolakis, 1990]  While
statistical evidence would be the most desirable basis for this evaluation, in reality the project
will have to rely on expert judgment.  Methods for the structured elicitation and utilization of
expert judgment have been developed and applied in major risk studies. [e.g., Keeney and von
Winterfeldt, 1991; Cooke, 1991; Draper, 1995; Budnitz et al, 1995]
It is recognized that QRA models rare events, some which have never happened and
others with very infrequent occurrences.  Additionally, human behavior and the severity of
some events may be challenging to understand.  These factors leave the risk assessment with
some recognized degree of uncertainty.  QRA highlights these issues and incorporates a
systematic process for treating them.  The importance of the uncertainties, and the degree to
which they are assessed, varies based on the decision requirements.
The successful application of Quantitative Risk Assessment provides an understanding
of the risks associated with the system and an expression of the uncertainties involved, which
together produce a relative risk ranking.  QRA forms the basis for risk-informed decision
making.
15
II.2 Decision Analysis
Decision Analysis (DA) is a formal process, Figure II.1, designed to structure complex
problems for analysis, deal with tradeoffs between multiple objectives, identify and quantify
sources of uncertainty, and incorporate subjective judgments.  DA is a methodology to assist
decision makers in achieving appropriate decisions.  Decision Analysis is applied to the case
of identifying the critical locations in infrastructures to assist in establishing the prioritization
methodology.  The prioritization methodology provides a guideline for rank ordering events
in many situations.  While the methodology is a general approach, which may be applied in
Identify the Problem
Identify Alternatives
Decompose and Model Problem
- Structure
- Uncertainty
- Preference
Choose Best Alternative
Sensitivity Analysis
Identify the Objectives
Make the Decision
Additional
Analysis
Needed
Decision Analysis
Yes
No
          Figure II.1 Decision Analysis [Loerch, 1996]
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numerous situations, the analysis is specific to each decision case.  The methodology is
portable, but the analysis must be repeated for each specific application.
The prioritization methodology is a structured approach that determines the most
appropriate prioritization based on a performance index (PI) calculated for each item. [Weil
and Apostolakis, 2001]  The priority of each item is ranked according to the PI.  The PI is the
sum of the weights of individual performance measures (PM) multiplied by the disutilities of
each item for that particular PM.  The PMs are measures of the community’s objectives.
where
PIj is the performance index for item j
wi is the weight of the performance measure i
dij is the disutility of performance measure i for item j
Kpm is the number of performance measures
In this application, PIA > PIB when the decision maker assess alternative A to cause more
disutility than alternative B.  The performance measures are designed to be independent,
meaning the preference for the consequences depend only on the individual levels of the
separate PMs, not on the way they are combined.  PMs are independent to prevent a double
count.  Pairs of PMs are Preference Independent of other PMs if preferences for the levels of
these two PMs do not depend on the value of any other PMs.  Also, a PM is Utility
Independent of other PMs of preferences for risky situations involving probabilities of the
different levels of the PM do not depend on the fixed level of any other PM.  Performance
measure independence leads to use of the above Additive Value Function for Disutility.
[Loerch, 1996]  In cases where the PMs are not independent the Multiplicative Value
Function must be employed.  In the analysis of critical infrastructures the PMs have been
designed to be independent.
Determination of the performance index follows a six step procedure. [Weil and
Apostolakis, 2001]
1.  Structure the objectives
2.  Determine the appropriate performance measures
∑=
pmK
i
ijij dwPI
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3.  Weighting objectives and performance measures
4.  Assessing disutility functions of performance measures
5.  Performing consistency checks
6.  Validating the results
Structuring the objectives is necessary to identify the fundamental objectives, those
fundamental to the decision maker in analyzing the environment.  Structuring also identifies
the means objectives, those not specifically important to the decision maker but which support
the fundamental objectives.  [Clemen, 1991]  A value tree, a hierarchical relationship, is
employed to structure the objectives and applicable performance measures.  The value tree for
the efficient prioritization of infrastructure renewal projects is shown in Figure II.2.  At the
top of the value tree is the overall goal.  In this example the Department of Facilities
developed the value tree specifically as a decision tool to help the decision makers prioritize
Prioritized List of 
Projects
Economic Impact 
of the Project
Coordination with 
Policies Programs & 
Operations
Impact on Health 
Safety & the 
Environment
Impact on 
People
Impact on the 
Environment
Impact on Property , 
Academic & Institute 
Operations 
Intellectual 
Property 
Damage
Physical 
Property 
Damage
Interruption of 
Academic Activities 
& Operations
Interruption 
Time
Complexity of 
Contingencies
Impact on 
Public Image
Internal Public 
Image
External Public 
Image
Programs 
Affected by the 
Project
Loss of Cost 
Savings
Objectives
Performance
Measures
Figure II.2 MIT DOF Value Tree for infrastructure
renewal projects.  [Karydas and Gifun, 2002]
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infrastructure renewal projects.  [Karydas and Gifun, 2002]  Below the overall goal are the
fundamental objectives.  Next down the tree are the means objectives, where appropriate.
Finally, the lowest level contains the performance measures.  The number of elements and
even the number of levels in the tree varies depending on the complexity of the decision and
the desires to the decision maker.
Performance measures, sometimes referred to as attributes, are used to determine the
extent to which the objectives are satisfied.  Natural scales often exist for the assessment of
PMs, like dollars for an economic objective or lost work days for a safety objective.  When
natural scales are not obvious, or not convenient, constructed scales are often used. [Keeney
and Merkhofer, 1987]  Often times the decision maker would prefer to use constructed scales
for all the performance measures, even the ones with clearly defined natural scales.
Constructed scales reduce the difficulty of assessment and allow the decision maker to
combine multiple metrics into a single PM.  A constructed scale is divided into zone levels
with a description of the criteria appropriate to that level.  The number of levels in each
constructed scale is determined by the decision maker, but there should be sufficient levels to
provide accurate results and not so many levels that the decision maker is overwhelmed.
Constructed scales are developed for all the performance measures.  A preliminary
constructed scale from the analysis of infrastructure networks, for physical property damage,
is shown in Table II.1.
Level Description
3
Catastrophic physical property damage,
  Greater than $10 million
2
Major physical property damage
  $1 million to $10 million
1
Minor physical property damage
  Less than $1 million
0 No physical property damage
Table II.1 Preliminary Constructed Scale for physical property damage
The decision maker next assigns weights to the performance measures using the
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP.) [Saaty, 1980]  The decision maker begins with a series of
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pair-wise comparisons between the fundamental objectives with respect to the primary goal.
The comparisons are made using linguistic scale shown in Table II.2.
Intensity of
Importance
Definition Explanation
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equally to the
objective.
3 Weak importance of one
over another
Experience and judgment slightly favor one
activity over another.
5 Essential or strong
importance
Experience and judgment strongly favor one
activity over another.
7 Very strong or
demonstrated importance
An activity is favored very strongly over
another; its dominance demonstrated in
practice.
9 Absolute importance The evidence favoring one activity over
another is of the highest possible order of
affirmation.
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values When compromise is needed.
Table II.2 AHP Comparison scale [Saaty, 1980]
After completing the comparisons among the fundamental objectives, the decision maker
moves down the value tree analyzing each level of objectives.  The weight of the fundamental
objective is passed down the value tree to the objectives below, with the weight being split
among the objectives using AHP.  [Weil and Apostolakis, 2001]  The value tree is completed
when all weights have been passed down the tree to the performance measures.     The value
tree is examined for consistence in AHP, with the decision maker determining the
inconsistencies and correcting the value tree to eliminate them.  [Saaty, 1980]  The weights
are converted into a 0 to 1 scale using a linear transformation.  The weights for the DOF value
tree for infrastructure renewal projects, Figure II.2, are shown in Table II.3.  The local weight
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describes the value of the objective, in relation to its siblings, to its parent objective.  The
global weight describes the value of the objective to the overall goal.
Objective Local
Weight
Global
Weight
I.  Impact on Health, Safety, and the Environment 0.491 0.491
  A.  Impact on People 0.600 0.295
  B.  Impact on the Environment 0.400 0.196
II.  Economic Impact of the Project 0.233 0.233
  C.  Economic Impact on Property, Academic and
      Institute Operations 0.600 0.140
    1.  Physical Property Damage 0.210 0.029
    2.  Intellectual Property Damage 0.550 0.077
    3.  Interruption of Academic Activities and
        Operations 0.240 0.034
      a.  Interruption Time 0.500 0.017
      b.  Complexity of Contingencies 0.500 0.017
  D.  Loss of Cost Savings 0.400 0.093
III.  Coordination with Policies, Programs, and
      Operations
0.276 0.276
  E.  Impact on Public Image 0.500 0.138
    4.  Internal Public Image 0.400 0.055
    5.  External Public Image 0.600 0.083
  F.  Programs Affected 0.500 0.138
Table II.3 Value tree weights for infrastructure renewal projects [Karydas and Gifun, 2002]
With the value tree and weights established, the decision maker assesses the disutility
functions associated with the performance measures.  The AHP is applied to the constructed
scale for each performance measure to develop the disutility function.  [Hughes, 1986]  For
each PM, the process follows the familiar pair-wise comparisons of the levels in the
appropriate constructed scale.  Once the weights have been assigned, and passed consistency
checks, they are converted into a 0 to 1 scale by a linear transformation.  The worst case
disutility has the value 1 (full impact of the PM), and the least case disutility has the value 0
(no impact from the PM.)  A constructed scale from the analysis of infrastructure networks,
for physical property damage, which the disutility weights included, is shown in Table II.4.
21
Level Description Disutility
3
Catastrophic physical property damage
  Greater than $10 million
1.00
2
Major physical property damage
  $1 million to $10 million
0.27
1
Minor physical property damage
  Less than $1 million
0.03
0 No physical property damage 0.00
Table II.4 Constructed Scale for physical property damage
Once the value tree (including all weights) and the constructed scales (with disutility
values) are complete the decision maker checks for consistency across the PMs.    For
example, compare the decision makers’ preferences between physical property damage and
impact on the environment, constructed scale displayed in Table II.5. The contribution
Level Description Disutility
3 Major Environmental Impact 1.00
2 Moderate Environmental Impact 0.34
1 Minor Environmental Impact 0.04
0 No Environmental Impact 0.00
Table II.5 Constructed Scale for environmental impact
to the overall assessment from each performance measure is the product of the weights of the
PM and the disutility from the constructed scale.  Comparing major physical property damage
with a minor environmental impact reveals the contribution from each PM to the overall goal
to be equal (less than 0.1% difference.)
PI (physical property damage) = weight (0.029) * disutility (0.27) = 0.00783
PI (environmental impact) = weight (0.196) * disutility (0.04) = 0.00784
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So, the decision maker should be indifferent to suffering major physical property damage or
minor environmental impact.  If not, the decision maker may adjust the value tree weights and
constructed scales disutility values until consistency is satisfied.
Finally, the decision analysis tool is benchmarked to validate the results.  The
prioritization tool is applied to several previously investigate cases and the results are
compared to the historical data.  The comparison serves to satisfy the decision maker that the
prioritization tool is producing the desired results.
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II.3 Networks and Minimal Cut Sets
In the search for understanding the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures the
concept of modeling the infrastructures as networks has been discussed. [Pate-Cornell and
Gikema, 2002; Amin, 1999; Ezell, et al, 2000; Ballocco, et al, 2003]  The network model and
underlying graph theory provides for mathematical analysis of the infrastructures in the effort
to identify the critical locations.
A graph G is an ordered triplet (V(G), E(G), _G) consisting of a nonempty set V(G) of
vertices, a set E(G), disjoint from V(G), of edges, and an incidence function _G that associates
with each edge of G an unordered pair of (not necessarily distinct) vertices of G.  If e is an
edge and u and v are vertices such that _G(e)=u,v then e is said to join u and v; the vertices u
and v are called ends of e. [Bondy and Murty, 1980]
For example, let
G = (V(G), E(G), _G)
where
V(G) = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8}
E(G) = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8}
_G(e1) = v1,v2        _G(e2) = v2,v3        _G(e3) = v3,v4       _G(e4) = v2,v5
_G(e5) = v5,v7       _G(e6) = v5,v6        _G(e7) = v7,v8        _G(e8) = v6,v8
The graph G is displayed in Figure II.3.
v6
v8
v7
v1
v3
v4
v5
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e8
e2
e3
Vertices
Edges 
Figure II.3 Diagram of graph G 
e4
v2e1
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For any graph H, with v vertices and e edges, there corresponds a vxe matrix called the
incident matrix of H.  The incident matrix M(H) = [mij], where mij is the number of times (0,
1, or 2) that vi and ej are incident  [Bondy and Murty, 1980].  When mij equals 0, the vertex i
and the edge j are not incident.  When mij equals 1, edge j either begins or ends at the vertex i.
When mij equals 2, edge j both begins and ends at the vertex i, making edge j a loop.  For the
graph G shown in Figure II.3 the incident matrix M(G) is displayed in Table II.6. The incident
Edges
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
v1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
v2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
v3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
v4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
v5 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
v6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
v7 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
V
er
tic
es
v8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table II.6 Incident matrix M(G) for graph G
matrix is created to serve as the input table for computer analysis.  This project employed
Mathematica® as a graph analysis tool.
Two vertices u and v are connected if there is a path between them.  In graph G
vertices v5 and v4 are connected along path v5, e4, v2, e2, v3, e3, and v4.  A cut edge (vertex)
is an edge (vertex) that, if removed from the graph, would separate the graph into two distinct
sections, having no path between them.  A terminal vertex, i.e., a vertex with only one
incident edge, can be a cut vertex in that it would separate that vertex from the rest of the
graph.  Examples of cut edges in graph G include edges e1, e2, e3, and e4; cut vertices
include vertex v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, and v8.  Edges e5, e6, e7, and e8 are not cut edges since the
removal of one of them does not separate the graph.  Similarly, vertices v6 and v7 are not cut
vertices.  A cut set K is a set of components (edges and/or vertices) that, if removed from the
graph, would separate the graph into two distinct sections.  [Bondy and Murty, 1980]
The discussion of edges has assumed the path to be bi-directional.  For example, in
graph G vertex v3 may be reached from vertex v3 via edge e2, and vertex v2 may be reached
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from vertex v3 via edge e2 (in the opposite direction.)  In such cases, graph G is non-directed,
i.e., the edge allows “flow” in either direction.    In some problems, such as interstate traffic
flow or some utility distribution systems, the edges in the graph should be modeled to allow
flow in one direction only.  A directed graph D is an ordered triplet (V(D), A(D), _D)
consisting of a nonempty set V(D) of vertices, a set A(D), disjoint from V(D), of arcs, and an
incidence function _D that associates with each arc of D an ordered pair of (not necessarily
distinct) vertices of D.  If a is an arc and u and v are vertices such that _D(a)=u,v then a is said
to join u and v; u  is the tail of a and v is its head. [Bondy and Murty, 1980]  Arc a allows
flow from vertex u to vertex v, but not from vertex v to vertex u.  A directed graph is
frequently referred to as a digraph. [Bondy and Murty, 1980]
For example, let
D = (V(D), A(D), _D)
where
V(D) = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8}
A(D) = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8}
_D(a1) = v1,v2       _D(a2) = v2,v3        _D(a3) = v3,v4       _D(a4) = v2,v5
_D(a5) = v5,v7       _D(a6) = v5,v6        _D(a7) = v7,v8        _D(a8) = v6,v8
Digraph D is displayed in Figure II.4.
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Figure II.4 Diagram of digraph D 
a4
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Digraphs have an incident matrix similar to graphs.  The incident matrix N(H) = [nij],
where nij (-1, 0, 1, or 2) is the incidence relationship between vertex vi and arc aj  [Bondy and
Murty, 1980].  When nij equals 0, the vertex i and the arc j are not incident.  When nij equals
1, the head of arc j is incident with vertex i.  When nij equals -1, the tail of arc j is incident
with vertex i.  When nij equals 2, arc j both begins (tail) and ends (head) at the vertex i,
making arc j a loop.  For the digraph D shown in Figure II.4 the incident matrix N(D) is
displayed in Table II.7.
Arcs
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
v1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
v2 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0
v3 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0
v4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
v5 0 0 0 1 -1 -1 0 0
v6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1
v7 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 0
V
er
tic
es
v8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table II.7 Incident matrix N(D) for digraph D
Similar to the discussion concerning graphs, in a digraph two vertices u and v are
connected, if there is a directed path between them.  In digraph D, vertex v4 is connected to
vertex v2 along the directed path v2, a2, v3, a3, and v4.  But, vertex v2 is not connected to
vertex v4 because there is not a directed path from vertex v4 to vertex v2.  The concept of a
cut arc (vertex) is the same for digraphs as graphs.
   To model an infrastructure, say water distribution, with a digraph, we let vertices
represent the valves, branches in the pipe, and the sources (supply vertices) and sinks (user
vertices.)  Arcs represent the water pipes.  We are interested in identifying the events that
interrupt service to the users.  Let digraph D represent a water distribution system, Figure II.5,
with one supplier (vertex v1) and two users, user A (vertex v4) and user B (vertex v8.)  The
supply node may be the actual water pumping station or it may just be a point in the water
distribution network.  In either case, the vertex is treated the same in the digraph analysis.  We
want to identify the cut sets (cut arcs and vertices, and sets of cut arcs and vertices) that
interrupt service to each user.  If the infrastructure service is interrupted from the user, we will
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consider the system to have failed, and we are interested in the cut set(s) responsible for that
failure.  For a set of components (arcs and vertices) C = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}.  A cut set K is a set of
components in C, which by failing causes the system to fail, interrupts the infrastructure
service to the user.  A cut set is said to be minimal if it cannot be reduced without losing its
status as a cut set [Bondy and Murty, 1980; Hoyland and Rausand, 1994]
For the analysis of infrastructures we will examine the cuts sets associated with each
user.  For example, analyzing digraph D in Figure II.5 for user A would produce many cut
sets, KA = {(a2), (a2,v3), (a2,a3), (a3,v3),…}.  The cut sets that can be reduced, i.e., (a2,v3)
and (a3,v3), are not minimal cut sets.  The cut sets that cannot be reduced, i.e., (a2) and (a3),
are minimal cut sets.
Minimal Cut Sets for digraph D in Figure II.5 are
User A, KA = {(a1), (a2), (a3), (v1), (v2), (v3), (v4)}
User B, KB = {(a1), (a4), (v1), (v2), (v5), (v8), (a6,a5), (a6,v7), (a6,a7),
                                    (a8,a5), (a8,v7), (a8,a7), (v6,a5), (v6,v7), (v6,a7)}
In analyzing the infrastructure network (digraph) for all users we are interested in
discovering those cut sets which have the greatest impact, those which, when successfully
attacked by terrorists, cause the greatest disutility among the user community.  When looking
at Figure II.4 one can intuitively see that cut sets (a1), (v1), and (v2) are more important than
v6
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Figure II.5 Digraph D of a water distribution network 
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any of the others because their loss causes an interruption of service to both user A and user
B.  Inspection is sufficient for very small system, but the decision maker would quickly
become overwhelmed as the size of the infrastructure grows.
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II.4 Risk Analysis Model
The Risk Analysis Model from the National Infrastructure Protection Center, NIPC,
[NIPC, 2002] forms the framework for the assessment of the MIT infrastructure.  This model
follows the following five steps:  Asset Assessment, Threat Assessment, Vulnerability
Assessment, Risk Assessment, and Identification of Countermeasure Options.  The
Infrastructure Critical Location Risk Analysis Methodology, outlined in Figure II.6, is a
decision analysis tool to assist the decision makers to fully evaluate the terrorism risk to the
MIT community.
Asset  Assessment
 Build the Value Tree (objectives and performance measures (PM))
 Develop the Constructed Scales (CS)
 Determine PM weights and CS weights
Threat Assessment
    Establish the Threat classifications
Vulnerability Assessment
 Analyze the susceptibility 
 Build the network models 
 Determine the minimal cut sets (mcs)
Risk Assessment
 Bring the Asset , Threat, and Vulnerability Assessment together
 Provide a prioritized list of the infrastructure vulnerabilities
Risk Management
 Countermeasure options to reduce overall risk
 Evaluate the impact of the countermeasure on all steps
C
on
ti
n
u o
u
s 
A
s s
e s
sm
en
t  
Figure II.6 Infrastructure Critical Location
             Risk Analysis Methodology
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II.4.A Asset Assessment
Asset Assessment is the process of understanding the “value” of the organization
being analyzed.  In the case of infrastructures the value is divided into distinct categories.
First is the value of the infrastructures themselves.  For example, the Hoover Dam has a
certain value based on the repair or replacement costs (i.e. excavation, concrete, steel,
machinery, and so on).  Hoover Dam also has value because it is a national monument, which
classifies it as a key asset.  Additionally, the dam has value from the services is provides to
the infrastructure users.  It supplies electricity to the national electric grid, and recreation to
the users of Lake Meade.  In many cases the contribution to the infrastructures, and the
associated end users, will significantly outweigh the repair costs or monumental “costs.”  The
asset value can be expressed in terms of consequences of an undesirable event impacting a
user.  A detailed asset assessment of the MIT community was conducted by the MIT
Department of Facilities. [Karydas and Gifun, 2002]  This assessment established a baseline
value of the assets, and will be discussed further in a following section.
II.4.B Threat Assessment
The Threat Assessment is specific to the community assets as established during the
Asset Assessment.  In a traditional threat assessment, the analyst would consider threats from
all sources, including natural disasters, accidents, and human-generated attacks.  This project
is focused on the terrorist threat and, therefore, it is limited to human-generated malicious
attack.  The Threat Assessment requires identification and detailed assessment of the
adversaries.  For the MIT community the threat could be an international terrorist group,
domestic terrorists, disgruntled community members, or others.  For each threat (or threat
group) the analyst will normally assess the intent, capability, as history of success of the
particular adversary to develop a profile for the threat.  The specific Threat Assessment is left
to the security specialists, and additional details are not discussed here.
For this analysis of the MIT community we will make use of three threat profiles.
These profiles are not the result of detailed threat assessments of security specialists, and
should not be considered real life threats to MIT.  The threat profiles are chosen to represent a
few of the possibilities facing the community.  The three scenarios we examine are:
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Major Threat A major threat is from an organization, group, or individual
with significant capabilities.  The threat may constitute a
severe pinpoint attack against one or more infrastructures or
a coordinated multi-axis attack against multiple locations.
The attack would result in damage requiring long term
restoration (greater than 1 month) and causing significant
impact on the community.
Moderate Threat A moderate threat is from a capable organization, group, or
individual.  The threat may constitute a pinpoint attack
against one or more infrastructures or a coordinated multi-
axis attack against two locations.  The attack would result in
damage requiring short term restoration (less than 1 month)
and causing moderate impact on the community.
Minor Threat A minor threat is from an organization, group, or individual
with limited capabilities.  The threat may constitute a single
pinpoint attack against one or more infrastructures.  The
attack would result in minor damage requiring minimal
restoration (less than one week) and causing minor impact on
the community.
II.4.C Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability is defined as the susceptibility of an entity to attack.  The Vulnerability
Assessment reviews the environment to develop an understanding of the system weaknesses.
In the case of critical infrastructures the analyst identifies and characterizes exploitable
situations in these infrastructures.  Susceptibilities may appear as poor access controls, such as
open systems connected to the internet or the physically open MIT community.  The lack of
locks, guards, or security procedures is a potential vulnerability.  The Vulnerability Analyst
typically asks the question, “If I were a terrorist, I would...”  This leads to a vide variety of
points for consideration as initiating events.
Through the application of expert judgment vulnerability may be classified into broad
categories to assist the analyst in describing the systems.  Definitions for each category will
depend on the specific environment and threat.  An example of susceptibility classifications is
presented in Table II.8.
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Level Description (examples)
Extreme Completely open, no controls, no barriers
High Unlocked, non-complex barriers (door or access panel)
Moderate Complex barrier, security patrols, video surveillance
Low Secure area, locked, complex closure
Very Low Guarded, secure area, locked, alarmed, complex closure
Zero Completely secure, no vulnerability (very unlikely)
Table II.8 Susceptibility categories
  A second piece to the understanding of vulnerability is the importance of the point
being described.  Consider that a street light, which is completely open with no controls or
barriers for protection, is extremely susceptible to attack.  This would lead to initially
classifying the street light as extremely vulnerable.  However, to complete the description the
analyst must consider the “value” of the street light.   The replacement costs of the bulb, or
even the entire light, are minimal.  The street light is not a key asset, nor does it hold any
monumental value.  The likelihood of the loss of a street light cascading through the electrical
distribution system is extremely small.  There are some societal costs for continuing life with
the street light out, but they should also be minor.  So, while the street light is extremely
susceptible to an attack it has very low value in the environment.  Therefore, the street light is
not a point that should be considered a critical location.   The vulnerability of a point is a
function of the susceptibility to attack and the value (from the asset assessment) of the point
in the environment (infrastructure.)  Vulnerability = f (Susceptibility, Value).  Vulnerability
categories are defined in Table II.9 and described in Table II.10.
Value
Susceptibility
Extreme High Moderate Low Very Low Zero
Extreme Red Red Orange Yellow Blue Green
High Red Orange Orange Yellow Blue Green
Moderate Orange Orange Yellow Blue Blue Green
Low Yellow Yellow Blue Green Green Green
Very Low Blue Blue Green Green Green Green
Zero Green Green Green Green Green Green
Table II.9 Vulnerability Categories
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Vulnerability Description
Red
This category represents a sever vulnerability in the infrastructure.  It is
reserved for the most critical locations.  Red vulnerabilities are those
requiring the most immediate attention and prompt action.
Orange
The Orange vulnerability condition is the second priority for counter
terrorism efforts.  These locations are generally moderately to extremely
valuable and moderately to extremely susceptible.
Yellow
The Yellow vulnerability condition is the third priority for counter
terrorism efforts.  These locations are normally less vulnerable because
they are either less susceptible or less valuable that the terrorist desires.
Blue
The Blue vulnerability condition is the fourth priority for counter
terrorism efforts.
Green
This is the final category for action.  It gathers all locations not included
in the more sever cases, typically those which are low (and below) on
the susceptibility scale and low (and below) on the value scale.  It is
recognized that constrained fiscal resources is likely to limit efforts in
this category, but it should not be ignored.
Table II.10 Vulnerability descriptions
II.4.D Risk Assessment
The Risk Assessment brings all the details together to provide the decision maker with
a framework to analyze the community and understand the global risk.  A prioritized list of
infrastructure vulnerabilities is produced dependent upon the value of the assets, the threat
specified by the security specialist, and the vulnerability of the infrastructures.  The decision
makers analyze the specified threat using the value tree and constructed scales developed
during the Asset Assessment.  A performance index (PI) table is compiled to represent the
disutility of each user for each infrastructure.  An example and full description of the PI table
is presented in Table III.8, in section III.C.  The decision maker combines the susceptibility of
the infrastructures with the value, represented by the performance index, to produce a
prioritized list of infrastructure vulnerabilities.
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II.4.E Identification of Countermeasure Options (Risk Management)
Risk management build on the risk assessment process by seeking answers to a second
set of three questions [Haimes, 1991]:
• What can be done and what options are available?
• What are the trade-offs in terms of costs, benefits, and risks?
• What are the impacts of current management decisions on future operations?
Countermeasures are intended to lower the overall risk to the assets.  For each countermeasure
the analyst must review the impact on each assessment for the entire community of assets.
The risk assessment is repeated to account for the impact of the countermeasure.  In assessing
the countermeasure options, the analyst must ensure to account for the ongoing cost of the
countermeasure.  Also, it is important to account for any negative contribution the
countermeasure may have to the overall risk.  For example, many infrastructures run
underground and are accessible via manholes.  To protect services in a manhole the analyst
may recommend welding the manhole covers in place to prevent unauthorized access.  The
ongoing cost of cutting the weld and re-welding the cover whenever access is required must
be considered.  Additionally, any cost (additional damage) incurred while emergency
personnel wait to cut the weld to gain access to the manhole must be accounted for in the
analysis.
II.4.F Continuous Assessment
Risk Assessment is not a one-time event, is must be a continuous process to achieve
success.  The analyst is required to vigilantly monitor the environment for changes that could
impact the analysis.  Asset values may change leading to a shift in consequences.  New threats
may emerge, old threats may fade away. Vulnerability may also change.  Continuous
assessment is necessary to timely address new risks.
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III. Screening Methodology for Critical Infrastructures
III.1 Overview
To analyze infrastructures for vulnerabilities this project models each of the MIT
campus infrastructures as an interconnected digraph.  Arcs represent conduits for service, i.e.
pipes for water and natural gas, and electrical cable for electricity.  Vertices represent
everything else in the infrastructure, including suppliers, users, pumps, valves, switches, and
branches.  Additionally, service access points are modeled as vertices.  The impact of losing a
service is modeled by the Performance Index (PI) measured through the disutility of the user
losing the service.  The PI is determined through analysis of the individual users with a value
tree and performance measure constructed scales.  Each user is analyzed to determine the
minimal cut sets (mcs), arcs and vertices, which produced an interruption of an infrastructure
supplied service.  A mcs may be impact more than one user and/or more than one
infrastructure.  Once all the users have been examined, a database is compiled of the mcs,
with the associated PI representing the “value” of the mcs to the infrastructure.  The
susceptibility of each mcs is assessed and combined with the value of the mcs to produce a
vulnerability assessment of the mcs.  A prioritized list of mcs for consideration is developed.
The infrastructure analysis model is a decision analysis tool to assist the decision
maker in identifying the critical locations in infrastructures.  The methodology for the
efficient prioritization of infrastructure renewal projects [Karydas and Gifun, 2002] served as
a starting point for the identification of critical locations in infrastructures.  Through the
application of expert judgment the value tree for the efficient prioritization of infrastructure
renewal projects was modified to serve as the value tree for the identification of critical
locations in infrastructures.  The constructed scales for the analysis of the performance
measures were adapted from the infrastructure renewal project for use in the critical location
analysis.  Network models of the selected infrastructures were developed and analyzed using
graph theory to identify potential critical locations, i.e. the points in the network which, if lost,
would lead to the greatest disutility among the user community.  The susceptibility of the
infrastructure network points were analyzed and combined with the performance index to
establish the vulnerability of each location.  Prioritization of the vulnerability list leads to the
identification of critical locations in infrastructures.
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III.2 The Value Tree
The Value Tree developed by the Department of Facilities (DOF) for the prioritization
of infrastructure renewal projects is shown in Figure II.2.  The objective and performance
measure weights for the value tree were developed through expert judgment in workshops
organized by DOF and are shown in Table II.3.  The value tree and associated weights were
developed using the AHP [Karydas and Gifun, 2002; Saaty, 1980] as described in section II.2.
The value tree is hierarchical in nature, i.e. information is passed from an objective to its
parent or children, and there is no information flow from an objective directly to a sibling.
Recall, the local weight represents the contribution by the objective to its parent objective,
and the global weight represents the contribution by the objective to the overall objective.
The DOF value tree contains many objectives and performances measures that are
appropriate for the identification of critical locations in infrastructures.  Rather than starting
from ground zero, we adapted the DOF value tree into a value tree for the identification of
critical locations in infrastructures.  A review was conducted on the DOF value tree to assess
the applicability of the objectives.  Loss of Cost Savings, objective II-D, does not apply.  This
objective captures the economic loss incurred if a particular infrastructure renewal project is
not completed.  For example, consider a section of water supply piping that requires periodic
maintenance to flush the water lines to prevent the build-up of undesirable material.  A
renewal project could replace the water supply line with an advanced material and eliminate
the required periodic system flush, saving maintenance costs.  There would be some impact to
the community during the project to replace the piping, which would be modeled with the
value tree.  A decision not to replace the piping would generate a “loss of cost savings” as the
periodic maintenance flush would be required to continue.  The Loss of Cost Savings
objective would capture that value.  For a terrorist event there is no opportunity to experience
a “loss of cost savings,” so that objective requires elimination.
Additionally, Complexity of Contingencies, objective II-C-3-b, does not apply.  This
objective is designed to capture the pre-planning impact costs of a renewal project.  For
example, replacement of floors in a building with Asbestos tiles requires relocation of the
building activities.  The cost to relocate the users, such as establishing temporary laboratories,
computing facilities, offices, and classrooms is modeled in the Complexity of Contingencies
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objective.  The actual impact from temporary relocation is captured in objective II-C-3-a,
Interruption Time.  Action taken in response to an immediate terrorist threat is not considered
in the complexity of contingencies objective, but is accounted for in the vulnerability
assessment.  No additional objectives were identified, therefore none was added.
The two objectives, Loss of Cost Savings and Complexity of Contingencies, are
eliminated from the value tree for terrorist event impact.  The Loss of Cost Savings objective
is eliminated first.  Figure III.1a shows a portion of the DOF value tree with the changes
outlined.  The Loss of Cost Savings is simply eliminated and the Impact on Property,
Academic, and Institute Operations is absorbed by the Economic Impact objective.  The
Economic Impact is renamed as the Economic Impact on Property, Academic, and Institute
Operations to more accurately reflect the objective, Figure III.1b.
Loss of 
Cost Savings
 Prioritized
Impact List
 Economic
Impact
Impact on Property , 
Academic, and 
Institute Operations
 Prioritized
Impact List
Economic Impact on 
Property, Academic, and 
Institute Operations
Figure III.1a DOF Value Tree (portion)
[Karydas and Gifun , 2002]
Figure III .1b Value Tree (portion)
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The Complexity of Contingencies objective was eliminated following the same
process.  Figure III.2a shows a portion of the DOF value tree with the changes highlighted.
The Complexity of Contingencies objective was simply eliminated and its sibling,
Interruption Time, was absorbed by the Impact on Property, Academic, and Institute
Operations, Figure III.2b.  Additionally, Coordination with Policies, Programs, and
Operations, objective III, was renamed Stakeholder Impact to more accurately reflect the
fundamental meaning of the impact category in the terrorism analysis.
The final value tree for the Impact of a Terrorist event is shown in Figure III.3.  This
value tree looks like it would if we had started from scratch and followed the decision
analysis process described in section II.2.  It represents the decision maker’s fundamental
objectives necessary in order to analyze the vulnerability of MIT community from terrorist
activities.  The value tree developed by a different decision maker may look different, as
would a value tree we designed to analyze a different problem.
Interruption of 
Academic Activities 
and Operations
Interruption
Time
Complexity of
Contingencies
Interruption of 
Academic Activities 
and Operations
Figure III .2a DOF Value Tree (portion)
[Karydas and Gifun , 2002]
Figure III.2b – Value Tree (portion)
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The intent of this analysis is to identify the critical locations in infrastructures.  We
have replaced the classification “objective” with “impact categories” as it is more
representative of the nature of this methodology.  We assigned the value tree weights using
the AHP as discussed in section II.2.  Since many of the impact categories and performance
measures were carried over from the infrastructure renewal project the weights associated
with those attributes were used as a starting point.  The importance of the three impact
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categories worked out the same for the two projects.  And, the weight of the Economic Impact
on Property, Academic, and Institute Operations (Economic Impact in the DOF value tree)
remains unchanged with respect to the sibling impact category (Impact on Health, Safety, and
the Environment; and Coordination with Policies, Programs, and Operations).  The Economic
Impact on Property, Academic, and Institute Operations objective retains weight 0.233.
In the DOF value tree the impact on property, academic, and institute operations
carries 60 percent of the economic impact, and loss of cost savings accounted for the
remaining 40 percent.  The 60 percent passed to the impact on property, academic, and
institute operations was further split among the three children (PMs.)  The split allocated 21
percent to physical property damage, 55 percent to intellectual property damage, and 24
percent to interruption of academic activities and operations.  So, the PM weight for
intellectual property damage in the DOF value tree was determined by:
where
wPM_ipd  is the global weight of the intellectual property damage PM.
wecon_imp  is the global weight of the economic impact fundamental impact category.
wimpact_pai  is the fractional split of the economic impact dedicated to the impact
                             on property, academic, and institute operations.
wintel_prop_dam  is the fractional split of the impact on property, academic, and
                       institute operations dedicated to intellectual property damage.
The weight of the Loss of Cost Savings objective, just eliminated, was absorbed by the
sibling objective (Impact on Property, Academic, and Institute Operations).  The new
fundamental impact category (Economic Impact on Property, Academic, and Institute
Operations) passes its entire weight (0.233) to its new children (Physical Property Damage,
Intellectual Property Damage, and Interruption of Academic Activities and Operations).  The
weight is split among the children in the same proportion as in the DOF value tree, where the
0.077
0.550*0.600*0.233
PM_ipd
PM_ipd
_damintel_propimpact_paiecon_impPM_ipd
w
w
w*w*ww
=
=
=
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three attributes were siblings.  In the critical infrastructure value tree the PM weight for
intellectual property damage in the DOF value tree is determined by:
where
wPM_ipd  is the global weight of the intellectual property damage PM.
wei_pai  is the global weight of the economic impact on property, academic,
                        and institute operations fundamental impact category.
wintel_prop_dam  is the fractional split of the economic impact on property, academic,
                                  and institute operations dedicated to intellectual property damage.
The weight of the Complexity of Contingencies objective, eliminated, was absorbed
by the sibling objective (Interruption Time), leaving the objective for the Interruption of
Academic Activities and Operations with one performance measure (Interruption Time).  The
PM was merged with the objective, creating a new performance measure (Interruption of
Academic Activities and Operations.)  The weight of the objective (Interruption of Academic
Activities and Operations) in the DOF value tree becomes the local weight of the PM in the
terrorism value tree.  The global weight is recalculated following the method illustrated for
the intellectual property damage PM.
The terrorism value tree, Figure III.3, and weights, Table III.1, are specific to
the MIT campus and the particular decision makers conducting the analysis.   These tools, the
impact categories, value tree, and weights are specific to the MIT community analysis for the
identification of critical locations in infrastructures.  Application of this methodology in
another environment would require development of applicable impact categories, value tree
and weights.
0.128
0.550*0.233
PM_ipd
PM_ipd
_damintel_propei_paiPM_ipd
w
w
w*ww
=
=
=
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Impact Category Local
Weight
Global
Weight
I.  Impact on Health, Safety, and the Environment 0.491 0.491
  A.  Impact on People 0.600 0.295
  B.  Impact on the Environment 0.400 0.196
II.  Economic Impact on Property, Academic and
      Institute Operations
0.233 0.233
  C.  Physical Property Damage 0.210 0.049
  D.  Intellectual Property Damage 0.550 0.128
  E.  Interruption of Academic Activities and
        Operations
0.240 0.056
III.  Coordination with Policies, Programs, and
      Operations
0.276 0.276
  F.  Impact on Public Image 0.500 0.138
    1.  Internal Public Image 0.400 0.055
    2.  External Public Image 0.600 0.083
  G.  Programs Affected 0.500 0.138
Table III.1 Value Tree impact category and performance measure weights
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III.3 Disutility and Constructed Scales
In the standard application of Decision Analysis the utility function produces a
measure of preference.  In this case the desire to avoid undesirable outcomes led to the
employment of disutility, i.e., the higher the disutility value the lower the desirability.  The
most and least desirable levels are represented by the extreme values of d=0 and d=1,
respectively.  The impact of each event is evaluated against the performance measures defined
in the value tree.  The constructed scales developed by the DOF were used as a starting point
for the critical infrastructure analysis.  DOF generated the constructed scales by following the
AHP method described in section II.2.  We applied the AHP methods as described in section
II.2 in developing the constructed scales for the identification of critical locations in
infrastructure value tree.
Constructed scales for physical property damage and environmental impact were
presented in Table II.4 and Table II.5 respectively.  The remaining constructed scales are
displayed in Tables III.2 through III.7.
Level Description Disutility
4
Extreme Interruption
  Greater than 6 months, entire buildings evacuated and
activities relocated.
1.00
3
Major Interruption
  1 to 6 months, laboratories evacuated and activities
relocated.
0.57
2
Moderate Interruption
  1 to 4 weeks, specialty classrooms evacuated and
activities relocated.
0.19
1
Minor Interruption
  Less than 1 week, a few administrative units or small
classrooms evacuated and activities relocated.
0.06
0 No Interruption 0.00
Table III.2 Constructed Scale for interruption of academic activities & operations
44
Level Description Disutility
3
Fatality or Lethal Exposure
  Ex. Roof Collapse, Falling Brick, Inhalation of Gas
1.00
2
Major Exposure with Long Term Effects
  Ex. Lead Poisoning
0.46
1
Minor Injury or Exposure
  Ex. Broken Arm, Laceration
0.05
0 No personal injury 0.00
Table III.3 Constructed Scale for impact on people
Level Description Disutility
3
Catastrophic intellectual property damage
  Long-term experiments
1.00
2
Major intellectual property damage
  Artifacts and rare documents
0.46
1
Minor intellectual property damage
  Non-backed up electronic data
0.05
0 No intellectual property damage 0.00
Table III.4 Constructed Scale for intellectual property damage
Level Description Disutility
3
Major degree of adverse publicity
  Petitions, sit-ins, demonstrations
1.00
2
Moderate degree of adverse publicity
  Negative articles published
0.34
1
Minor degree of adverse publicity
  Verbal complaints
0.04
0 No adverse publicity 0.00
Table III.5 Constructed Scale for internal public image
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Level Description Disutility
3
Major degree of adverse publicity
  Affects enrollment, contributions, program funding,
  or faculty recruiting
1.00
2
Moderate degree of adverse publicity
  National / International Media 0.57
1
Minor degree of adverse publicity
  Local media 0.06
0 No adverse publicity 0.00
Table III.6 Constructed Scale for external public image
Level Description Disutility
4
Extreme Impact
  Greater than $20 million and/or impacting greater
than 250 students
1.00
3
Major Impact
  $10 million to $20 million and/or impacting 50 to 250
students
0.50
2
Moderate Impact
  $1 million to $10 million and/or impacting 5 to 50
students
0.23
1
Minor Impact
  Up to $1 million and/or impacting up to 5 students
0.02
0 No Impact 0.00
Table III.7 Constructed Scale for programs affected
Following completion of the value tree (including all weights) and the constructed
scales (with disutility values) we checked for consistency across the PMs.  For example, we
compared our preferences between programs affected, Table III.7, and interruption of
academic activities and operations, Table III.2.  The contribution to the overall assessment
from each performance measure is the product of the weights of the PM and the disutility
from the constructed scale.  Comparing a moderate impact on programs affected with a major
46
interruption of academic activities and operations reveals the contribution from each PM to
the overall goal to be very close.
PI (programs affected) = weight (0.138) * disutility (0.23) = 0.0318
PI (interruption of academic activities and operations) =
                                   weight (0.056) * disutility (0.57) = 0.0319
The consistency check suggests that we should be indifferent to suffering a moderate impact
on programs affected or suffering a major interruption of academic activities and operations.
If we are not indifferent then we would adjust the value tree weights and constructed scale
disutility values to reflect our preference.
As another example we performed a three way comparison among intellectual
property damage (major intellectual property damage), Table III.4, internal public image
(major degree of adverse publicity), Table III.5, and interruption of academic activities and
operations (extreme interruption), Table III.2.
PI (intellectual property damage) = weight (0.128) * disutility (0.46) = .0589
PI (internal public image) = weight (0.055) * disutility (1.00) = 0.0550
PI (interruption of academic activities and operations) =
                                   weight (0.056) * disutility (1.00) = 0.0560
The consistency check suggests we are indifferent to suffering a major degree of adverse
publicity or an extreme interruption of academic activities and operations.  Also, that we
value major intellectual property damage as slight more damaging (these are disutilities) than
a major degree of adverse publicity or an extreme interruption of academic activities and
operations.  If these do not reflect our preferences then we would adjust the value tree weights
and constructed scale disutility values as necessary.
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 III.4 Network Models
The infrastructures are modeled using networks to take advantage of existing network
analysis in our investigation.  For this study the analysis is limited to three interconnected
hard infrastructures: Natural Gas, Water, and Electricity.  Wireless networks, both telephone
and data, present different challenges and are not addressed in this work.  The original
analysis contains actual locations and infrastructure designations that are MIT campus
specific.  The work presented in this report is from the MIT analysis, but the names and
designators have been changed to prevent any inadvertent release of potentially sensitive
information.
Figure III.4 shows a portion on the Natural Gas distribution system.  This section of
the MIT community is isolable from the remainder of the natural gas distribution system with
an isolation valve upstream of the Supply point.  This particular section of the campus
Building
Valve
Supply
Bldg F
Bldg E
Bldg C
Bldg D
Bldg B
Bldg A
Figure III.4 Natural Gas distribution schematic (partial)
Manhole
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represents one supply and six users, five end users and one user (building F) configured to
allow gas flow through to other portions of the network.
The network representation of this portion of the natural gas distribution system
is shown in Figure III.5.  The network vertices, shown as circles, represent the supply, users,
valves, branches, and manhole access points in the piping system.  All connected vertices
have one or more associated arcs.  The vertices are numbered, inside the circles, for
identification purposes to support network analysis.  The arcs, shown as lines, represent the
piping.  All arcs have two, and only two, associated vertices.  An arc may be incident to the
same vertex at both its tail and head, in which case the arc forms a loop starting and ending at
the same vertex.  A dead end pipe would have an originating vertex and a dummy vertex at
the “dead end.”  The arcs are numbers, adjacent to each arc.
The natural gas system contains few flow directors, such as check valves or pressure
reducers.  Direction of gas flow is determined by the pressure gradient.  Normally the supply
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Figure III.5 – Natural Gas distribution network digraph
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will be at relatively high pressure and user at relatively low pressure, so gas will flow from
supply to user.  The network is represented in the incident matrix shown in Table III.8.
Most arcs are directed, having a specific tail (-1) and head (1), because flow goes in one
direction only.  Some arcs, ga16 for example, are non-directed.  These arcs, indicated with
two 1s, one for each incident vertex, permit flow in either direction depending on the network
configuration and pressure gradient.  The natural gas distribution system contains two vertices
(ev3 and ev8) which are part of the electrical distribution system.  These vertices are electric
manholes designed primarily to serve as access points to the electric distribution switching
network.  The natural gas piping runs through, or adjacent to, the two identified manholes.
The electrical and natural gas networks are not physically connected at the manhole, but are
Natural Gas Arcs (ga)
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E
le
ct
ri
c 
(e
v)
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0N
at
ur
al
 G
as
 (
gv
)
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0V
er
tic
es
 -
19 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table III.8 Incident matrix for natural gas distribution
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geographically coincident.  The two infrastructures are connected in cases where electricity is
powering a natural gas pressurizing pump or a natural gas fired turbine is generating
electricity.  In the case of connected infrastructures the natural network modeling would use a
vertex to model the incidence of the two networks.  In modeling the MIT infrastructures, we
included vertices to account for those geographic locations where two or more infrastructures
are coincident.  A vertex is also used to model the situations where an infrastructure is
geographically coincident with itself.  For example, this can occur when two gas pipes (not
physically connected to allow flow) are located in the same service man-way.
Figure III.6 shows a portion of the Water distribution system.  This section of the MIT
community is isolable from the remainder of the water distribution system with an isolation
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Figure III.6 Water distribution schematic (partial)
Manhole
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valve upstream of the Supply point.  This particular section of the campus represents one
supply and the same six users modeled in the natural gas network.
 The network representation of this portion of the water distribution system is shown
in Figure III.7.  The network vertices, shown as circles, represent the supply, users, valves,
branches, and manhole access points in the piping system.  All connected vertices have one or
more associated arcs.  The vertices are numbered for identification purposes to support
network analysis.  The arcs, shown as lines, represent the piping.
The water system contains few flow directors, such as check valves or pressure
reducers.  Direction of water flow is determined by the pressure gradient.  Normally the
supply will be at relatively high pressure and user at relatively low pressure, so water will
flow from supply to user.  The network is represented in the incident matrix shown in Table
III.9.  All the water distribution arcs in the displayed section are directed, having a specific
tail (-1) and head (1), because flow goes in one direction only.  The water distribution
network may have sections which allow water flow in either direction, similar to the natural
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Figure III.7 – Water distribution network digraph
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gas network discussed previously.  In the case of non-directed flow, the arc is indicated with
two 1s, one for each incident vertex, permitting flow in either direction depending on the
network configuration and pressure gradient.
The water distribution system contains two vertices (ev8 and ev11) which are part of
the electrical distribution system.  These vertices are electric manholes designed primarily to
serve as access points to the electric distribution switching network.  As with the natural gas
piping passing through the electric manhole, the electrical and water networks are not
physically connected at the manhole, but are geographically coincident.  The modeling is
consistent with the previous description.
Water Arcs (wa)
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E
le
ct
ri
c 
(e
v)
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
W
at
er
 (
w
v)
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0V
er
tic
es
 -
19 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table III.9 Incident matrix for water distribution
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The MIT electrical system, both generation and distribution, is handled in the Central
Utilities Plant.  Major electrical buses are energized from the natural gas fired turbine
generator or back-up generation.  The electrical buses feed the electrical cables disbursed
through campus to provide electricity to the users (buildings.)  An electrical cable forms a
loop on the campus, beginning at bus ‘A’, winding through campus in service ducts, and
ending at bus ‘B.’  Electricity may originate from either bus.  Switches places along the cable
direct electricity to various buildings.  The system is made up of a number of loops, with each
loop providing electricity to several buildings.  A schematic, Figure III.8, shows two
distribution loops for the section of campus coinciding with the  natural gas and water
infrastructures.  The loops are modeled with non-directed edges, as electricity can flow in
either direction around the loop.  The electric lines from the switches to the buildings are
modeled with directed arcs, as electricity only flows from the distribution loop to the building.
The network representation of these portions of the electrical distribution system are
shown in Figure III.9 (loop one) and Figure III.10 (loop two.)  The network vertices, shown as
circles, represent the supply, users, switches, branches, and manhole access points in the
Supply Bus A Supply Bus B
Figure III.8 Electrical distribution schematic (partial)
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Figure III.9 Electrical distribution network digraph (loop one)
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Figure III.10 Electrical distribution network digraph (loop two)
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cabling system.  The vertices are numbered, inside the circles, for identification purposes to
support network analysis.  The edges and arcs, shown as lines, represent the electrical cables.
The electrical service ducts run primarily underground and are accessible from a number of
manholes located throughout campus.  The manholes provide service access for technicians to
conduct maintenance.  The electric manholes (there is an independent set of
telecommunications manholes on campus) are primarily associated with the electrical
distribution system, however in some cases other infrastructure services run through or
immediately adjacent to the manholes.  Some of the manholes contain only cabling; these are
modeled by a vertex with two incident arcs (or edges), and electricity simply flows through
these manholes.  Other manholes contain switches which accept electricity from either loop
direction and provide current to the user (building.)  These points are modeled by a vertex
Electric Arcs (wa)
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0   
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23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table III.10 Incident matrix for electrical distribution (loop one)
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with three or more incident vertices to account for splitting the electricity flow.  The incident
matrices for loops one and two of the electrical distribution system are displayed in Table
III.10 and Table III.11, respectively.
We analyzed the network digraphs, using Mathematica®, to produce the minimal cut
sets for each user for each infrastructure.  The complete listing of mcs, by infrastructure and
user, is provided in Appendix A.1.  When reviewing the complete listing of mcs the reader
will find over 1,000 mcs listed.  The list is meshed to account for mcs which impact more
than one user and/or more than one infrastructure.  For example the cut set (ea5,ea16) impacts
electricity to two users, building A and building D.  The user-infrastructure combination
Electric Arcs (wa)
 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
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40 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table III.11 Incident matrix for electrical distribution (loop two)
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impacted by the mcs is recorded, the mcs listed once, and the duplicates are eliminated.  A
user-infrastructure combination refers to one infrastructure supplied to one user.  For
example, water service to building A is one user-infrastructure combination and water service
to building B is another user-infrastructure combination.  This example contains eighteen
user-infrastructure combinations, three infrastructures (natural gas, water, and electricity) for
each of six users (buildings A, B, C, D, E, and F.)  We sorted and analyzed the sets using
Microsoft Excel®.  Following the elimination of duplicates, there remain 663 unique mcs for
the section of the MIT community being analyzed.  That is, there are 663 different locations
(or combination of locations) that, if attacked, would lead to the loss of one or more
infrastructures to one or more users.  There are seven mcs which impact six user-
infrastructure combinations.  For example mcs (ev1,ev2) impacts electrical service to all six
buildings, and mcs (wv15) impacts water to all six users.  The complete breakdown of the
number of user-infrastructure combinations affected by mcs is shown in Table III.12.  While
the mcs which impact the most user-infrastructure combinations would seem to provide hints
as to the prioritization, the analysis is not complete until the vulnerability is incorporated.
Number of mcs Number of user-infrastructure
combinations impacted
7 6
7 5
11 4
107 3
256 2
275 1
Table III.12 mcs impact on User-Infrastructure combinations
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III.5 Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Having completed the framework for the analysis of the infrastructures, we analyze
the community for the specified threat.  For this example, we will analyze for a minor threat,
section II.4.B, which is from an organization, group, or individual with limited capabilities.
The threat may constitute a single pinpoint attack against one or more infrastructures.  The
attack would result in minor damage leading to minimal restoration and causing a minor
impact on the community.  Using the constructed scales, we determined the level
representative of the damage and impact.  Looking at the constructed scale for the interruption
of academic activities and operations, Table III.13, for electrical service to building A, we
classified the impact from the selected threat as level 1, minor interruption.  So, if the attack
Assessment Level Description Disutility
4
Extreme Interruption
  Greater than 6 months, entire buildings
evacuated and activities relocated.
1.00
3
Major Interruption
  1 to 6 months, laboratories evacuated and
activities relocated.
0.57
2
Moderate Interruption
  1 to 4 weeks, specialty classrooms evacuated
and activities relocated.
0.19
_ 1
Minor Interruption
  Less than 1 week, a few administrative units or
small classrooms evacuated and relocated.
0.06
0 No Interruption 0.00
Table III.13 Constructed Scale for interruption of academic activities & operations
caused an interruption in electrical service to building A, the contribution to the Performance
Index, for building A electrical service, from the interruption of academic activities and
operations would be the global weight of the performance measure (0.056) multiplied by the
assessed disutility (0.06), which is 0.00336.
The remaining constructed scales are used to determine the contribution from the other
performance measures to the PI for electrical service to building A.  When the summation
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across all the PMs in completed, the resulting PI for electrical service to building A is
0.02117.  The other infrastructure services to building A are analyzed following the same
methodology, resulting in a PI for natural gas service to building A of 0.00865 and a PI for
water service to building A of 0.01477.  Once the building A assessment was completed we
analyzed the other five users (buildings B, C, D, E, and F) for each infrastructure by following
the same process.  The PIs are likely to be different because the users are heterogeneous, have
different infrastructure service needs, and perform functions of differing value to the
community.  In this example building E and F are very similar, so there PIs are the same in
many cases.  The result is a PI for each of the eighteen user-infrastructure combinations
considered in the example.  The detailed constructed scales are provided in Appendix A.2,
and the Performance Index for each user-infrastructure is summarized in Table III.14.
Infrastructure
User Electric Natural Gas Water
Building A 0.02117 0.00865 0.01477
Building B 0.02901 0.01505 0.02117
Building C 0.06490 0.01141 0.00979
Building D 0.07274 0.02117 0.02117
Building E 0.02980 0.00865 0.02340
Building F 0.02980 0.00865 0.02340
Table III.14 Performance Index for user-infrastructure combination
Once the PI is calculated for each user-infrastructure combination, the PI of each mcs
is calculated as follows:
where
PImcsk is the performance index for minimal cut set mcsk
MCS is the total number of mcs
mcsijk is a Boolean operator (1 when the mcsk impacts the
                        user-infrastructure combination ij, and 0 otherwise)
PIij is the performance index for the combination of user i and infrastructure j
i is the user  (1 – 6, for building A, B, C, D, E, F)
j is the infrastructure (1 – 3, for electric, natural gas, water)
∑∑∑
=
=
MCS
k
ijijk
i j
mcsk PImcsPI
1
)*(
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For example, mcs (ea5, ea16) impacts electrical service to building A and building D, and no
other user-infrastructure combinations.  The Boolean operator mcsijk, for k representing the
mcs (ea5, ea16), equals one when i equals 1 (electric) and j equals 1 (building A) or when i
equals 1 (electric) and j equals 4 (building D), and zero in the remaining sixteen user-
infrastructure combinations.  So, the PImcsk, where k representing the mcs (ea5, ea16), equals
the PI for electrical service to building A (0.02117) plus the PI for electrical service to
building D (0.07274), which is 0.09391.  This process is repeated for every mcs to assign a PI
to each mcs, using Microsoft Excel®.  The PI tabulations for each mcs are presented in
Appendix A.3.  Some of the mcs with the highest PI are shown in Table III.15.
PI Number
of mcs
 mcs
0.24742 1 (ev1,ev2)
0.15881 47 (ev23,ev6), (ev1,ev5), (ea20,ev4), (ea19,ev2), ….
0.11508 1 (ev8)
0.11370 3 (wv14), (wv15), (wa20)
0.09391 48 (ev21,ev6), (ev20,ev5), (ea17,ev2), (ev21,ev10), ….
0.09030 2 (wv16), (wa19)
0.08861 55 (ev24,ev42), (ea40,ev42), (ea39,ev38), (ev1,ev37), …
Table III.15 Performance Index values associated with minimal cut sets
The list of mcs, ordered by PI, indicates which mcs, which if successfully attacked,
would lead to the greatest disutility in the MIT community.  The mcs (ev1, ev2), because it
carries the greatest PI, would cause the most significant impact.  The ordered list suggests
which mcs should be considered as critical locations, but the analysis is not complete, the
vulnerability assessment must be completed to determine the actual critical locations.
The PI for each mcs is the “value” portion of the vulnerability, so the susceptibility is
analyzed following the guidelines established in section II.4.C.  The susceptibility of each
mcs is categorized in a level described by Table II.8.  For example a successful attack against
mcs (ev1, ev2) requires an attack against ev1 and a separate attack against ev2.  The
susceptibility depends on the nature of the attack, for example the explosive range of a truck
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bomb is quite different from the explosive range of a suitcase bomb.  The susceptibility of
each must be analyzed and then combined to establish the susceptibility of mcs (ev1, ev2).
For example, if we assessed the susceptibility of ev1 to be high and the susceptibility of ev2
to be low, we would assess the combined susceptibility (both ev1 and ev2) to be low.  In
general a mcs with multiple components would be no more susceptible than the most secure
of the individual pieces, but could be less susceptible than the most secure piece when the
combination of all components is considered.
The threat for the particular example presented is a minor threat, which includes only a
single point attack (i.e., an attack against one location.)  Since a minor threat is not capable of
a multi-axis attack, we may simplify the susceptibility analysis by classifying all mcs with
two or more elements as zero susceptibility.  We must consider this simplification carefully,
however, as it is not appropriate for more advanced threats in which a coordinated multiple
location attack must be considered.  We assessed the susceptibility of each mcs using the
classification levels presented in Table II.8, the complete susceptibility assessments, for the
mcs with assessed to have susceptibility of very low or greater, are listed in Appendix A.4.
Having established the value of each mcs (the PI) and the susceptibility, we combine
the two using the guidelines established in Table II.9, to assign each mcs a vulnerability
category.  For example, looking at mcs wa20 we find it corresponds to the main water line
serving the selected portion of campus.  Failure of this line would result in loss of water
service to all six users.  The PI for mcs wa20 places it in the extreme value category.  Since
the water line is buried with no service access, it would be difficult to attack.  As a result we
classified the susceptibility of the water line as very low.  Applying the guidelines in Table
II.9, we intersect extreme value with very low susceptibility resulting in Blue vulnerability.
The complete vulnerability categorizations are detailed in Appendix A.5, and summarized in
Table III.16.
Through application of the infrastructure risk analysis model, we now have a
prioritized list of mcs for consideration in risk management.  The single mcs (ev8) with
vulnerability red is dealt with first.  We trace ev8 back to the network digraph and schematics
to determine its identity.  In this case, ev8 is identified as an electric service manhole in the
selected portion of campus.  The manhole has a specific identifier which uniquely identifies
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the location.  In order to prevent the inadvertent release of the location, this manhole is
referred to as EM-X by this analysis.    Manhole EM-X contains the main electrical service
Vulnerability
Category
Number
of mcs
 mcs
Red 1 (ev8)
Orange 0  none
Yellow 5  (ev21), (ev22), (ev3), (ev34), (ev9)
Blue 19
(wa20), (wv14), (wv15), (ev11), (ev18), (ev19),
(ev25), (gv1), (gv2), (gv3), (gv4), (gv5), (gv6),
(wv1), (wv2), (wv3), (wv4), (wv5), (wv6)
Green 60
(ea10), (ea18), (ea30), (ga11), (ga19), (ga20),
(gv14), (gv15), (gv16), (gv17), (gv18), (wa11),
(wa8), (wv18), (wv19), (wa19), (wv16), (ea15),
(ea38), (ga1), (ga10), (ga17), (ga18), (ga2), (ga21),
(ga3), (ga4), (ga5), (ga6), (ga7), (ga8), (ga9),
(gv10), (gv13), (gv19), (gv20), (gv7), (gv8), (gv9),
(wa1), (wa10), (wa13), (wa15), (wa17), (wa18),
(wa2), (wa21), (wa3), (wa4), (wa5), (wa6), (wa7),
(wa9), (wv11), (wv12), (wv13), (wv20), (wv7),
(wv8), (wv9)
Table III.16 Vulnerability Categories for the minimal cut sets
switch to building D, so a successful attack against this manhole would interrupt electrical
service to the building.  Additionally, the natural gas and water service to building D also run
through, or immediately adjacent to, manhole EM-X.  A successful attack against this
manhole would also interrupt the natural gas and water service to building D.  A schematic of
manhole EM-X is presented in Figure III.11.  The electric switches are designed to allow
electricity flow in either direction (from EM-A to EM-X to EM-B, or from EM-B to EM-X to
EM-A) and split the feed to provide electric service to building D.  The natural gas and water
service both come from their corresponding service network, via a building isolation valve,
through the manhole to building D.  This manhole shows a geographic vulnerability of
multiple infrastructures which are not physically connected.  None of the three services
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(electric, natural gas, or water) are connected to each other inside the manhole, yet all three
are vulnerable to a single attack.
Building D
Electric
 Manhole EM -X
Natural Gas
Supply
Water
Supply
Electric
 Manhole
 EM- A
Electric
 Manhole
 EM -B
Figure III.11 Electric Manhole EM-X
switch switch
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III.6 Risk Management
We now proceed to risk management of the vulnerabilities.  The protection of the
critical locations is accomplished by reducing the susceptibility of the location, reducing the
value of the location, or some combination of the two.  In reality the threats could be
eliminated, but that is a law enforcement issue which is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Many options for countermeasures are available and one must consider the options and the
associated risks and benefits carefully.  Potential actions are analyzed to support the selection
of an appropriate countermeasure or combination of countermeasures.  Each potential
countermeasure is assessed against a set of common attributes to support comparison among
the possibilities.  We have chosen the set of attributes (security method, control method, cost,
on-going cost, supply reliability, service quality) as shown in Figure III.12.  The number of
attributes, and the attributes themselves, are chosen by the decision makers.  Just as with the
value tree, a different set of decision makers is likely to have different attributes, and we
would have different attributes when addressing a different problem.
From our example, the starting point is the red category (mcs ev8, manhole EM-X),
which has the highest priority for countermeasure actions.  Some possible countermeasures,
not an exhaustive list, to address susceptibility and value of the critical location are shown in
Table III.17.  We review the possible countermeasures to select the most appropriate for the
situation, recognizing that taking no action is always a possibility which must be considered.
Category Possible Countermeasures
Reduce Susceptibility
Weld the manhole cover
Alarm the manhole cover
Monitor the manhole cover
Increase the security patrols
Reduce Value
Install additional independent infrastructure supply lines
Install internal (to the building) back-up sources
Table III.17 Possible Countermeasures
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Public Image
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Property 
Damage
Interruption of 
Academic 
Activities and 
Operations
Intellectual
Property
Damage
Figure III.12 Decision Analysis and Risk Management
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Analysis and
Assessment
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Decisions
Select
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Security
Method
… ..
Service
Quality
Supply
Relaibility
On-going
Cost
Cost
Control
Method
For example, to review the possibility of welding the manhole cover to reduce the
susceptibility we consider the attributes in Figure III.12.  The security method is a physical
barrier (the weld) to access of the manhole.  The access is controlled by cutting and re-
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welding the cover as required.  Cutting the weld would require tools and sufficient time.  Our
assessment is that welding the cover would reduce the susceptibility from high to low.  There
is no change in the value of the location; the supply reliability and service quality remain
unchanged.  The cost of welding is low; as is the on-going cost (the manhole is not routinely
accessed.)  The new vulnerability category for manhole EM-X (mcs ev8) is Yellow (low
susceptibility and extreme value.)
To look at the value portion of the equation, we consider the installation of additional
infrastructure service to the affected user (building D.)  Additional services are considered for
each of the infrastructures.  The PI for building D, for all three services, is 0.11508, as
presented in Appendix A.3.  The electric service accounts for 63 percent of that value, or
0.07274, with water and gas accounting for the rest.  Installing an additional electrical feed to
the building would reduce the PI of the manhole to 0.04234 (low).  Considering only the
additional electrical service the new vulnerability category for manhole EM-X (mcs ev8) is
Yellow (high susceptibility and low value.)  The costs of installing and maintaining the
service is significant and must be considered.
If we choose to take both steps, installing the additional electrical service and welding
the manhole cover, the new vulnerability category for manhole EM-X (mcs ev8) would be
Green (low susceptibility and low value.)   Once a countermeasure is selected, the analysis is
repeated taking into account the impact of the countermeasure.  The decision maker should
review the entire process to ensure there are no unintended consequences of the
countermeasure.  Once satisfied, the decision maker would move to the next vulnerability.  In
the event that no countermeasure is chosen, the decision maker just proceeds to the next
vulnerability.  In this example, there are no mcs categorized as Orange, so the decision
makers proceed to the Yellow category.  The process repeats until the decision maker feels
satisfied in the risk management efforts.  Continuous assessment ensures the community risk
profile is reviewed on a regular basis.
67
IV. Comments
The analysis of the MIT community served to validate the screening methodology for
the identification of critical locations in infrastructures.  We gained significant insight into the
infrastructure system through the development of the network digraphs.  In the case where the
decision makers are interested solely in the number of user-infrastructure combinations
impacted by each location, the network models provide that information without further
analysis.  However, this approach would ignore the vulnerability portion of the analysis.  By
excluding the vulnerability assessment, the analyst could remove the human judgment from
the prioritization.  In effect, the decision maker would be presented with a list of infrastructure
locations ordered by the number of user-infrastructure combinations they impact.  To develop
a more realistic prioritization of the locations the vulnerability must be included in the
analysis.  The treatment of uncertainties and expert judgment become important in this
process.  The threat assessment is limited in that terrorist risk assessment studies are generally
classified.  [Garrick, 2002]   This study worked with fixed threat parameters and the
uncertainties were incorporated through expert judgment at the performance measure level.
This methodology is a screening methodology to identify the candidate critical locations.
These locations are subjected to a review panel and the critical locations are identified
through expert judgment.  Another way of looking at it is that we have developed a
methodology for initial screening and identification of critical locations.  A rigorous
uncertainty analysis, including organizational response, would be done for these critical
locations.
The MIT case study revealed some issues with regard to the screening of critical
locations in infrastructures and infrastructure analysis.  The availability of infrastructure
documentation cannot be overlooked.  The MIT study had the benefit of full, unrestricted
access to the infrastructure design, layout, location, and operating instructions.  In expanding
the analysis beyond the confines of MIT, it is anticipated that obtaining infrastructure
documentation will be challenging.  The data mining task itself could prove complicated, as
the data must be gathered from multiple utilities and various governmental agencies.  It is
recognized that commercial data may be proprietary and governmental data may be classified.
Also, the issue of data completeness must be faced.  Even if the analyst had full access to the
68
industry and government data there is a concern the information may not be complete.
During some of the older construction of utility infrastructures good records were not kept
concerning the location of lines.  Data accuracy must also be addressed, for it is not certain
that accurate records exist concerning growth and changes.  Unauthorized modifications may
exist and authorized modifications may not be properly documented.
Another issue which must be considered by the analyst is the impact of isolation for
the damaged portion of the networks.  For example, consider again the sample water
distribution network reviewed in Figure II.5.  If a successful attack were conducted against v5,
the analyst could immediately determine that water would be denied to user B.  The impact on
user A requires a more detailed review.  The likely upstream isolation point for the damage at
v5 is the next upstream valve; in this case assume that valve to be v2, see Figure IV.1.   While
the damage to v5 is the direct cause of the loss of water suffered by user B, the isolation
required is the cause of the loss of water to user A.  The loss of water to the users may be of
different durations.  The restoration to user B may require replacement of valve v5 and repair
of the associated water pipes, which may be moderate in duration.  Water pipe a4 may be
temporarily capped to provide isolation, so the valve v2 maybe reopened to restore service to
user A; which could be minor in duration.  The analyst must take care to ensure the true
impact of potential attacks is included in the analysis.
The MIT campus contains sufficient infrastructure components that it provides a good
prototype.  MIT operates a utility plant, utilities distribution network, data network, cable
v6
v8
v7
v1
v3
v4
v5
a6
a5 a7
a8
a2
a3
Vertices
Arcs
Figure IV.1 Water distribution network with damage and isolation 
a4
v2a1
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User BDamage
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television station, and phone system, and has its own police and medical personnel.  The MIT
campus contains a Critical Infrastructure, the Central Utilities Plant, and a Key Asset, the
Nuclear Research Reactor.  The Reactor does not use natural gas, so there would be no impact
in the event of an interruption of natural gas service.  Sufficient water inventory is maintained
within the reactor complex to withstand a water outage of significant duration.  The loss of
electrical service would possibly be an impact.  The Reactor Operations team has sufficiently
analyzed the impact of loss of the electrical service, and no additional risks are anticipated
from the infrastructure analysis.
Several drawbacks were uncovered.  First, there are very limited physical
dependencies between the infrastructures on the MIT campus.  The natural gas fired electric
generation turbine and electric driven domestic water pumps account for most of the
infrastructure ties.  There is no water pumping stations or natural gas pressurization points on
the campus.    Second, the campus could be viewed as homogeneous with regard to mission;
MIT is primarily a research institution.  This eased our determination of the disutility on the
users.  In expanding the scope to model a city, for example, the decision makers may have
more difficulty comparing disutility across society.  Political influence, which was not
experienced in the MIT study, may become a factor.  Finally, the impact of a loss of one or
multiple infrastructures on law enforcement and firefighting was not included in the MIT
prototype.  Faced with a significant electric power or water outage society must address the
issue of rioting and looting.  Those objectives may influence the decision.
The issues of outages and maintenance, both preventative and corrective, were not
included in the analysis.  Clearly, the unavailability of certain components could impact the
prioritization index.  To gain additional accuracy the unavailability periods should be
included.
The screening methodology may be expanded beyond MIT to a smaller scale (larger
area).  The decision makers will make an assessment of the level of detail to be analyzed,
which will impact the complexity of the model.  Trying to model every building in the nation,
or even the state, would likely prove exhausting.  At the city level the decision makers may
decide, for a first look, to represent each neighborhood as a vertex and model the ties between
the cities with arcs.  The second level analysis could look deeper into each neighborhood.  On
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a national level the decision makers may, for example, choose to look at the interstate
transmission voltage network for electricity.  By focusing on a specific voltage the decision
makers should be able to bound the problem.  Another approach could be to identify the
critical facilities in a region like hospitals, emergency response units, water pumping stations,
electrical generation (and distribution substations), etc.  Then model their infrastructure
supplies using the network digraphs.  The methodology could then be used to identify the
critical locations in the infrastructures serving the identified facilities.
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V.  Conclusions
This project presents a screening methodology to analyze infrastructures to identify
the critical locations.  The methodology itself is a general approach which may be used in a
number of prioritization situations.  The general portions include the development and
application of the value tree, constructed scales, and the AHP to assign weights to the
objectives and performance measures.  These techniques are commonly applied in decision
analysis.  The infrastructures are “valued” through application of this general approach.  The
details of the process reviewed in this project apply only to the specific decision considered
for the specific decision makers.  A different set of decision makers, applying the
methodology to the same problem, may arrive at a different ending.  However, using such an
explicit methodology may help the disagreeing parties to reach consensus, because their
disagreements will be specific.  And, the same decision makers using the process to prioritize
a different problem would achieve different results.  The methodology makes use of a
quantitative approach which supports a specific numerical comparison of the effects of
different threats and different targets.
The portion of the methodology specific to the MIT campus infrastructures is the
modeling of the infrastructures as interconnected digraphs and accompanying application of
graph theory and reliability theory to identify the vulnerable points, modeled as minimal cut
sets.  A mcs may be impact more than one user and/or more than one infrastructure.  Once all
the users have been examined, a database is compiled of the mcs, with the associated PI
representing the “value” of the mcs to the infrastructure.  The susceptibility of each mcs is
assessed and combined with the value of the mcs to produce a vulnerability assessment of the
mcs.  A prioritized list of mcs for consideration is developed.
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Appendix A.1 Minimal Cut Sets by Infrastructure and User
Minimal Cut Sets – Natural Gas
Bldg E (vertex gv5)
{(gv14), (ga20), (gv15), (ga18), (gv13), (ga17),
 (gv5)}
Bldg C (vertex gv3)
{(gv14), (ga20), (gv15), (ga19), (gv16), (gv17),
(ga11), (gv18), (ga8), (gv19),    (ga5),      (gv20),
(ga6), (gv7), (ga7), (gv3), (ga12,ga15), (ga12,gv12),
(ga12,ga16), (ga12,gv6), (ga12,ga22), (ga12,ev3), (ga12,ga14), (ga12,gv11),
(ga12,ga13)}
Bldg B (vertex gv2)
{(gv14), (ga20), (gv15), (ga19), (gv16), (gv17),
(ga11), (gv18), (ga8), (gv19), (ga5), (gv20),
(ga4), (gv8), (ga3), (gv2), (ga12,ga15), (ga12,gv12),
(ga12,ga16), (ga12,gv6), (ga12,ga22), (ga12,ev3), (ga12,ga14), (ga12,gv11),
(ga12,ga13)}
Bldg A (vertex gv1)
{(gv14), (ga20), (gv15), (ga19), (gv16), (gv17),
(ga11), (gv18), (ga8), (gv19), (ga2), (gv9),
(ga1), (gv1), (ga12,ga15), (ga12,gv12), (ga12,ga16), (ga12,gv6),
(ga12,ga22), (ga12,ev3), (ga12,ga14), (ga12,gv11), (ga12,ga13)}
Bldg D (vertex gv4)
{(gv14), (ga20), (gv15), (ga19), (gv16), (gv17),
(ga11), (gv18), (ga10), (gv10), (ga9), (ev8), 
(ga21), (gv4), (ga12,ga15), (ga12,gv12), (ga12,ga16), (ga12,gv6),
(ga12,ga22), (ga12,ev3), (ga12,ga14), (ga12,gv11), (ga12,ga13)}
Bldg F (vertex gv6)
{(gv14), (ga20), (gv15), (ga19), (gv16), (gv6),
(ga15,ga12), (ga15,gv17), (ga15,ga13), (ga15,gv11), (ga15,ga14), (ga15,ev3),
(ga15,ga22), (gv12,ga12), (gv12,gv17), (gv12,ga13), (gv12,gv11), (gv12,ga14),
(gv12,ev3), (gv12,ga22), (ga16,ga12), (ga16,gv17), (ga16,ga13), (ga16,gv11),
(ga16,ga14), (ga16,ev3), (ga16,ga22)}
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Minimal Cut Sets – Water
Bldg F (vertex wv6)
{(wv14), (wa20), (wv15), (wa15), (wv12), (wv6),
(wa14,wa12), (wa14,wv17), (wa14,wa16), (wv10,wa12), (wv10,wv17), (wv10,wa16),
(wa22,wa12), (wa22,wv17), (wa22,wa16)}
Bldg E (vertex wv5)
{(wv14), (wa20), (wv15), (wa19), (wv16), (wa11),
(wv18), (wa10), (wv13), (wa17), (wv5)}
Bldg D (vertex wv4)
{(wv14), (wa20), (wv15), (wa19), (wv16), (wa9),
(wv11), (wa21), (ev8), (wa13), (wv4)}
Bldg A (vertex wv1)
{(wv14), (wa20), (wv15), (wa19), (wv16), (wa11),
(wv18), (wa8), (wv19), (wa2), (wv9), (wa1),
(wv1)}
Bldg C (vertex wv3)
{(wv14), (wa20), (wv15), (wa19), (wv16), (wa11),
(wv18), (wa8), (wv19), (wa5), (wv20), (wa6),
(wv7), (wa7), (wv3)}
Bldg B (vertex wv2)
{(wv14), (wa20), (wv15), (wa19), (wv16), (wa11),
(wv18), (wa8), (wv19), (wa5), (wv20), (wa4),
(wv8), (wa3), (ev11), (wa18), (wv2)}
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Minimal Cut Sets – Electric
Bldg C (vertex ev22)
{(ev22), (ea18), (ev21), (ea19,ea17), (ea19,ev20), (ea19,ea16),
(ea19,ev18), (ea19,ea14), (ea19,ev17), (ea19,ea13), (ea19,ev15), (ea19,ea12),
(ea19,ev14), (ea19,ea9), (ea19,ev8), (ea19,ea8), (ea19,ev10), (ea19,ea7),
(ea19,ev6), (ea19,ea5), (ea19,ev5), (ea19,ea3), (ea19,ev4), (ea19,ea2),
(ea19,ev13), (ea19,ea1), (ea19,ev2), (ev23,ea17), (ev23,ev20), (ev23,ea16),
(ev23,ev18), (ev23,ea14), (ev23,ev17), (ev23,ea13), (ev23,ev15), (ev23,ea12),
(ev23,ev14), (ev23,ea9), (ev23,ev8), (ev23,ea8), (ev23,ev10), (ev23,ea7),
(ev23,ev6), (ev23,ea5), (ev23,ev5), (ev23,ea3), (ev23,ev4), (ev23,ea2),
(ev23,ev13), (ev23,ea1), (ev23,ev2), (ea20,ea17), (ea20,ev20), (ea20,ea16),
(ea20,ev18), (ea20,ea14), (ea20,ev17), (ea20,ea13), (ea20,ev15), (ea20,ea12),
(ea20,ev14), (ea20,ea9), (ea20,ev8), (ea20,ea8), (ea20,ev10), (ea20,ea7),
(ea20,ev6), (ea20,ea5), (ea20,ev5), (ea20,ea3), (ea20,ev4), (ea20,ea2),
(ea20,ev13), (ea20,ea1), (ea20,ev2), (ev1,ea17), (ev1,ev20), (ev1,ea16),
(ev1,ev18), (ev1,ea14), (ev1,ev17), (ev1,ea13), (ev1,ev15), (ev1,ea12),
(ev1,ev14), (ev1,ea9), (ev1,ev8), (ev1,ea8), (ev1,ev10), (ev1,ea7),
(ev1,ev6), (ev1,ea5), (ev1,ev5), (ev1,ea3), (ev1,ev4), (ev1,ea2),
(ev1,ev13), (ev1,ea1), (ev1,ev2)}
Bldg B (vertex ev25)
{(ev25), (ea38), (ev11), (ev24,ea37), (ev24,ev26), (ev24,ea36),
(ev24,ev27), (ev24,ea34), (ev24,ev29), (ev24,ea33), (ev24,ev30), (ev24,ea32),
(ev24,ev32), (ev24,ea29), (ev24,ev3), (ev24,ea28), (ev24,ev35), (ev24,ea27),
(ev24,ev36), (ev24,ea25), (ev24,ev37), (ev24,ea23), (ev24,ev38), (ev24,ea22),
(ev24,ev40), (ev24,ea41), (ev24,ev42), (ev24,ea42), (ev24,ev2), (ea39,ea37),
(ea39,ev26), (ea39,ea36), (ea39,ev27), (ea39,ea34), (ea39,ev29), (ea39,ea33),
(ea39,ev30), (ea39,ea32), (ea39,ev32), (ea39,ea29), (ea39,ev3), (ea39,ea28),
(ea39,ev35), (ea39,ea27), (ea39,ev36), (ea39,ea25), (ea39,ev37), (ea39,ea23),
(ea39,ev38), (ea39,ea22), (ea39,ev40), (ea39,ea41), (ea39,ev42), (ea39,ea42),
(ea39,ev2), (ea40,ea37), (ea40,ev26), (ea40,ea36), (ea40,ev27), (ea40,ea34),
(ea40,ev29), (ea40,ea33), (ea40,ev30), (ea40,ea32), (ea40,ev32), (ea40,ea29),
(ea40,ev3), (ea40,ea28), (ea40,ev35), (ea40,ea27), (ea40,ev36), (ea40,ea25),
(ea40,ev37), (ea40,ea23), (ea40,ev38), (ea40,ea22), (ea40,ev40), (ea40,ea41),
(ea40,ev42), (ea40,ea42), (ea40,ev2), (ev1,ea37), (ev1,ev26), (ev1,ea36),
(ev1,ev27), (ev1,ea34), (ev1,ev29), (ev1,ea33), (ev1,ev30), (ev1,ea32),
(ev1,ev32), (ev1,ea29), (ev1,ev3), (ev1,ea28), (ev1,ev35), (ev1,ea27),
(ev1,ev36), (ev1,ea25), (ev1,ev37), (ev1,ea23), (ev1,ev38), (ev1,ea22),
(ev1,ev40), (ev1,ea41), (ev1,ev42), (ev1,ea42), (ev1,ev2)}
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Bldg A (vertex ev19)
{(ev19), (ea15), (ev18), (ea19,ea14), (ea19,ev17), (ea19,ea13),
(ea19,ev15), (ea19,ea12), (ea19,ev14), (ea19,ea9), (ea19,ev8), (ea19,ea8),
(ea19,ev10), (ea19,ea7), (ea19,ev6), (ea19,ea5), (ea19,ev5), (ea19,ea3),
(ea19,ev4), (ea19,ea2), (ea19,ev13), (ea19,ea1), (ea19,ev2), (ev23,ea14),
(ev23,ev17), (ev23,ea13), (ev23,ev15), (ev23,ea12), (ev23,ev14), (ev23,ea9),
(ev23,ev8), (ev23,ea8), (ev23,ev10), (ev23,ea7), (ev23,ev6), (ev23,ea5),
(ev23,ev5), (ev23,ea3), (ev23,ev4), (ev23,ea2), (ev23,ev13), (ev23,ea1),
(ev23,ev2), (ea20,ea14), (ea20,ev17), (ea20,ea13), (ea20,ev15), (ea20,ea12),
(ea20,ev14), (ea20,ea9), (ea20,ev8), (ea20,ea8), (ea20,ev10), (ea20,ea7),
(ea20,ev6), (ea20,ea5), (ea20,ev5), (ea20,ea3), (ea20,ev4), (ea20,ea2),
(ea20,ev13), (ea20,ea1), (ea20,ev2), (ev1,ea14), (ev1,ev17), (ev1,ea13),
(ev1,ev15), (ev1,ea12), (ev1,ev14), (ev1,ea9), (ev1,ev8), (ev1,ea8),
(ev1,ev10), (ev1,ea7), (ev1,ev6), (ev1,ea5), (ev1,ev5), (ev1,ea3),
(ev1,ev4), (ev1,ea2), (ev1,ev13), (ev1,ea1), (ev1,ev2), (ea17,ea14),
(ea17,ev17), (ea17,ea13), (ea17,ev15), (ea17,ea12), (ea17,ev14), (ea17,ea9),
(ea17,ev8), (ea17,ea8), (ea17,ev10), (ea17,ea7), (ea17,ev6), (ea17,ea5),
(ea17,ev5), (ea17,ea3), (ea17,ev4), (ea17,ea2), (ea17,ev13), (ea17,ea1),
(ea17,ev2), (ev20,ea14), (ev20,ev17), (ev20,ea13), (ev20,ev15), (ev20,ea12),
(ev20,ev14), (ev20,ea9), (ev20,ev8), (ev20,ea8), (ev20,ev10), (ev20,ea7),
(ev20,ev6), (ev20,ea5), (ev20,ev5), (ev20,ea3), (ev20,ev4), (ev20,ea2),
(ev20,ev13), (ev20,ea1), (ev20,ev2), (ea16,ea14), (ea16,ev17), (ea16,ea13),
(ea16,ev15), (ea16,ea12), (ea16,ev14), (ea16,ea9), (ea16,ev8), (ea16,ea8),
(ea16,ev10), (ea16,ea7), (ea16,ev6), (ea16,ea5), (ea16,ev5), (ea16,ea3),
(ea16,ev4), (ea16,ea2), (ea16,ev13), (ea16,ea1), (ea16,ev2), (ev21,ea14),
(ev21,ev17), (ev21,ea13), (ev21,ev15), (ev21,ea12), (ev21,ev14), (ev21,ea9),
(ev21,ev8), (ev21,ea8), (ev21,ev10), (ev21,ea7), (ev21,ev6), (ev21,ea5),
(ev21,ev5), (ev21,ea3), (ev21,ev4), (ev21,ea2), (ev21,ev13), (ev21,ea1),
(ev21,ev2)}
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Bldg D (vertex ev9)
{(ev9), (ea10), (ev8), (ea19,ea8), (ea19,ev10), (ea19,ea7),
(ea19,ev6), (ea19,ea5), (ea19,ev5), (ea19,ea3), (ea19,ev4), (ea19,ea2),
(ea19,ev13), (ea19,ea1), (ea19,ev2), (ev23,ea8), (ev23,ev10), (ev23,ea7),
(ev23,ev6), (ev23,ea5), (ev23,ev5), (ev23,ea3), (ev23,ev4), (ev23,ea2),
(ev23,ev13), (ev23,ea1), (ev23,ev2), (ea20,ea8), (ea20,ev10), (ea20,ea7),
(ea20,ev6), (ea20,ea5), (ea20,ev5), (ea20,ea3), (ea20,ev4), (ea20,ea2),
(ea20,ev13), (ea20,ea1), (ea20,ev2), (ev1,ea8), (ev1,ev10), (ev1,ea7),
(ev1,ev6), (ev1,ea5), (ev1,ev5), (ev1,ea3), (ev1,ev4), (ev1,ea2),
(ev1,ev13), (ev1,ea1), (ev1,ev2), (ea17,ea8), (ea17,ev10), (ea17,ea7),
(ea17,ev6), (ea17,ea5), (ea17,ev5), (ea17,ea3), (ea17,ev4), (ea17,ea2),
(ea17,ev13), (ea17,ea1), (ea17,ev2), (ev20,ea8), (ev20,ev10), (ev20,ea7),
(ev20,ev6), (ev20,ea5), (ev20,ev5), (ev20,ea3), (ev20,ev4), (ev20,ea2),
(ev20,ev13), (ev20,ea1), (ev20,ev2), (ea16,ea8), (ea16,ev10), (ea16,ea7),
(ea16,ev6), (ea16,ea5), (ea16,ev5), (ea16,ea3), (ea16,ev4), (ea16,ea2),
(ea16,ev13), (ea16,ea1), (ea16,ev2), (ev21,ea8), (ev21,ev10), (ev21,ea7),
(ev21,ev6), (ev21,ea5), (ev21,ev5), (ev21,ea3), (ev21,ev4), (ev21,ea2),
(ev21,ev13), (ev21,ea1), (ev21,ev2), (ea14,ea8), (ea14,ev10), (ea14,ea7),
(ea14,ev6), (ea14,ea5), (ea14,ev5), (ea14,ea3), (ea14,ev4), (ea14,ea2),
(ea14,ev13), (ea14,ea1), (ea14,ev2), (ev17,ea8), (ev17,ev10), (ev17,ea7),
(ev17,ev6), (ev17,ea5), (ev17,ev5), (ev17,ea3), (ev17,ev4), (ev17,ea2),
(ev17,ev13), (ev17,ea1), (ev17,ev2), (ea13,ea8), (ea13,ev10), (ea13,ea7),
(ea13,ev6), (ea13,ea5), (ea13,ev5), (ea13,ea3), (ea13,ev4), (ea13,ea2),
(ea13,ev13), (ea13,ea1), (ea13,ev2), (ev15,ea8), (ev15,ev10), (ev15,ea7),
(ev15,ev6), (ev15,ea5), (ev15,ev5), (ev15,ea3), (ev15,ev4), (ev15,ea2),
(ev15,ev13), (ev15,ea1), (ev15,ev2), (ea12,ea8), (ea12,ev10), (ea12,ea7),
(ea12,ev6), (ea12,ea5), (ea12,ev5), (ea12,ea3), (ea12,ev4), (ea12,ea2),
(ea12,ev13), (ea12,ea1), (ea12,ev2), (ev14,ea8), (ev14,ev10), (ev14,ea7),
(ev14,ev6), (ev14,ea5), (ev14,ev5), (ev14,ea3), (ev14,ev4), (ev14,ea2),
(ev14,ev13), (ev14,ea1), (ev14,ev2), (ea9,ea8), (ea9,ev10), (ea9,ea7),
(ea9,ev6), (ea9,ea5), (ea9,ev5), (ea9,ea3), (ea9,ev4), (ea9,ea2),
(ea9,ev13), (ea9,ea1), (ea9,ev2), (ev18,ea8), (ev18,ev10), (ev18,ea7),
(ev18,ev6), (ev18,ea5), (ev18,ev5), (ev18,ea3), (ev18,ev4), (ev18,ea2),
(ev18,ev13), (ev18,ea1), (ev18,ev2)}
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Bldg E, F (vertex ev34)
{(ev34), (ea30), (ev3), (ea40,ea28), (ea40,ev35), (ea40,ea27),
(ea40,ev36), (ea40,ea25), (ea40,ev37), (ea40,ea23), (ea40,ev38), (ea40,ea22),
(ea40,ev40), (ea40,ea41), (ea40,ev42), (ea40,ea42), (ea40,ev2), (ev1,ea28),
(ev1,ev35), (ev1,ea27), (ev1,ev36), (ev1,ea25), (ev1,ev37), (ev1,ea23),
(ev1,ev38), (ev1,ea22), (ev1,ev40), (ev1,ea41), (ev1,ev42), (ev1,ea42),
(ev1,ev2), (ev24,ea28), (ev24,ev35), (ev24,ea27), (ev24,ev36), (ev24,ea25),
(ev24,ev37), (ev24,ea23), (ev24,ev38), (ev24,ea22), (ev24,ev40), (ev24,ea41),
(ev24,ev42), (ev24,ea42), (ev24,ev2), (ea39,ea28), (ea39,ev35), (ea39,ea27),
(ea39,ev36), (ea39,ea25), (ea39,ev37), (ea39,ea23), (ea39,ev38), (ea39,ea22),
(ea39,ev40), (ea39,ea41), (ea39,ev42), (ea39,ea42), (ea39,ev2), (ev11,ea28),
(ev11,ev35), (ev11,ea27), (ev11,ev36), (ev11,ea25), (ev11,ev37), (ev11,ea23),
(ev11,ev38), (ev11,ea22), (ev11,ev40), (ev11,ea41), (ev11,ev42), (ev11,ea42),
(ev11,ev2), (ea37,ea28), (ea37,ev35), (ea37,ea27), (ea37,ev36), (ea37,ea25),
(ea37,ev37), (ea37,ea23), (ea37,ev38), (ea37,ea22), (ea37,ev40), (ea37,ea41),
(ea37,ev42), (ea37,ea42), (ea37,ev2), (ev26,ea28), (ev26,ev35), (ev26,ea27),
(ev26,ev36), (ev26,ea25), (ev26,ev37), (ev26,ea23), (ev26,ev38), (ev26,ea22),
(ev26,ev40), (ev26,ea41), (ev26,ev42), (ev26,ea42), (ev26,ev2), (ea36,ea28),
(ea36,ev35), (ea36,ea27), (ea36,ev36), (ea36,ea25), (ea36,ev37), (ea36,ea23),
(ea36,ev38), (ea36,ea22), (ea36,ev40), (ea36,ea41), (ea36,ev42), (ea36,ea42),
(ea36,ev2), (ev27,ea28), (ev27,ev35), (ev27,ea27), (ev27,ev36), (ev27,ea25),
(ev27,ev37), (ev27,ea23), (ev27,ev38), (ev27,ea22), (ev27,ev40), (ev27,ea41),
(ev27,ev42), (ev27,ea42), (ev27,ev2), (ea34,ea28), (ea34,ev35), (ea34,ea27),
(ea34,ev36), (ea34,ea25), (ea34,ev37), (ea34,ea23), (ea34,ev38), (ea34,ea22),
(ea34,ev40), (ea34,ea41), (ea34,ev42), (ea34,ea42), (ea34,ev2), (ev29,ea28),
(ev29,ev35), (ev29,ea27), (ev29,ev36), (ev29,ea25), (ev29,ev37), (ev29,ea23),
(ev29,ev38), (ev29,ea22), (ev29,ev40), (ev29,ea41), (ev29,ev42), (ev29,ea42),
(ev29,ev2), (ea33,ea28), (ea33,ev35), (ea33,ea27), (ea33,ev36), (ea33,ea25),
(ea33,ev37), (ea33,ea23), (ea33,ev38), (ea33,ea22), (ea33,ev40), (ea33,ea41),
(ea33,ev42), (ea33,ea42), (ea33,ev2), (ev30,ea28), (ev30,ev35), (ev30,ea27),
(ev30,ev36), (ev30,ea25), (ev30,ev37), (ev30,ea23), (ev30,ev38), (ev30,ea22),
(ev30,ev40), (ev30,ea41), (ev30,ev42), (ev30,ea42), (ev30,ev2), (ea32,ea28),
(ea32,ev35), (ea32,ea27), (ea32,ev36), (ea32,ea25), (ea32,ev37), (ea32,ea23),
(ea32,ev38), (ea32,ea22), (ea32,ev40), (ea32,ea41), (ea32,ev42), (ea32,ea42),
(ea32,ev2), (ev32,ea28), (ev32,ev35), (ev32,ea27), (ev32,ev36), (ev32,ea25),
(ev32,ev37), (ev32,ea23), (ev32,ev38), (ev32,ea22), (ev32,ev40), (ev32,ea41),
(ev32,ev42), (ev32,ea42), (ev32,ev2), (ea29,ea28), (ea29,ev35), (ea29,ea27),
(ea29,ev36), (ea29,ea25), (ea29,ev37), (ea29,ea23), (ea29,ev38), (ea29,ea22),
(ea29,ev40), (ea29,ea41), (ea29,ev42), (ea29,ea42), (ea29,ev2)}
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Appendix A.2 Performance Index (PI) calculation for each
                         user-infrastructure combination
This appendix presents the constructed scales used by the decision maker to assess the
disutility for each user-infrastructure combination.  The global weight is contained along side
each constructed scale for reference.  The scales are presented in user order (building A,
building B, …, building F).  The decision makers’ analysis of the appropriate level on the
constructed scale, for the specific threat, is annotated with a 1 in the row indicating the
constructed scale level under the appropriate infrastructure column.  The columns are
designated E for electrical service, NG for natural gas service, and W for water service.
When the decision maker has completed the analysis each constructed scale will contain three
1 entries, one for each infrastructure.  A summary of the final PI entries is:
Infrastructure
User Electric Natural Gas Water
Building A 0.02117 0.00865 0.01477
Building B 0.02901 0.01505 0.02117
Building C 0.06490 0.01141 0.00979
Building D 0.07274 0.02117 0.02117
Building E 0.02980 0.00865 0.02340
Building F 0.02980 0.00865 0.02340
